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DOMAIN KNOWLEDGE AND THE
TEACHING OF CREATIVE LEGAL
PROBLEM SOLVING
STEFAN

H. KRIEGER*

This article explores the relationship between students' knowledge of underlying legal doctrine and their ability to learn effective
methods of practice in law school skills courses. One of the primary
goals of skills training in law school, especially clinical legal education, is to teach students how to apply what they have learned in doctrinal courses in the "real world." While much has been written
about training students in proper methods of practice and problem
solving in skills courses, little attention has been paid to the significance of doctrinalknowledge to this training. Reviewing recent cognitive psychology research on the development of expertise and
creativity, and in particular,a number of empirical studies examining
the development of clinical skills in medical education, this article
concludes that basic knowledge of substantive legal doctrine is a necessary prerequisite to learning effective legal practice. Skills law
teachers, for the most part, have incorrectly downplayed that role.
The article concludes by proposing some curricularchanges in skills
and clinical programs to take into account the role that legal doctrine
performs in learning effective methods of legal practice and suggests
future empirical studies on the relationship between legal doctrine
and skills training in the legal education setting.

Recently, I assigned two students in my Housing Rights Clinic a
fairly complex judicial review case at the beginning of the semester.
The case concerned a tenant in a rent-regulated apartment who was
forced to move from her home after a fire. Pursuant to an administrative rule, the tenant's rent was reduced to $1.00. After a year, when
the landlord had not completed the repairs to the apartment, the tenant had nowhere else to live and moved back into the apartment. She
continued to pay $1.00 rent. The landlord filed an application with the
agency to restore the pre-fire rent, but the agency administrator de* Professor of Law, Hofstra University. B.A., University of Chicago; J.D., University
of Illinois. I wish to thank John De Witt Gregory, David R. Kaufman, Lawrence W. Kessler, Gary H. Palm, and Vimla L. Patel for their assistance on this manuscript. I especially
wish to express my appreciation to Richard K. Neumann, Jr., who introduced me to the
writings of Mihaly Csikszentmihalyi. I also wish to give my gratitude to my research assistants Monica Renee Austin, Elizabeth Quinn, Teresa Staples, and Steven Wilkins for their
help in preparation of this article. Finally, I would like to thank Hofstra University for
providing me with the research support that made this article possible.
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nied the request, finding that all the repairs had not been made. The
landlord appealed this decision to the agency's commissioner. Over a
year-and-a-half later, while this appeal was still pending, the landlord
sold the property to another company, and this company filed a nonpayment eviction action against the tenant. That action was settled by
a stipulation under which the new landlord agreed to make repairs,
the tenant agreed to begin paying full rent, and the new landlord
waived all rent then due. This new landlord then sold the property to
the present landlord.
A year later - almost two years after the original landlord had
appealed to the commissioner - the commissioner reversed the administrator's order and held that the pre-fire rent should have been
restored once the tenant moved back into the apartment. The present
landlord then served a demand on the tenant for approximately
$16,000 in rent it alleged was owing under the commissioner's order.
At this point, the tenant, who had been proceeding pro se in the
agency, sought help from the Clinic.
My Housing Rights Clinic is a one-semester, six credit course,
and the students I assigned the case were in their last semester of law
school. They were well above-average students: one was a law review
editor and the other had extensive experience interning for a judge.
By the time they received the case, the student from the prior semester had conducted substantial legal research and filed the initial pleading instituting a judicial review proceeding in the trial court; the
agency had filed its brief; the original landlord (which had sold the
property two years previously) had filed a motion to intervene in the
case; and the present landlord had filed an eviction case in a lower
court because the tenant had not paid the past-due $16,000. The students faced a three-and-a-half week deadline for filing the reply to the
agency's brief.
I viewed the case as a treasure trove of interesting procedural and
substantive legal questions and challenging lawyer/client relationship
issues. Procedurally, the case posed questions about the authority of
the commissioner to override the decision of the administrator; the
powers of the trial court in reviewing an agency decision; the right of
the previous landlord to intervene; and the interplay between the judicial review and eviction cases. Substantively, the case raised issues
about the commissioner's construction of the relevant administrative
rules; the evidentiary support in the administrative record for the decision; the rights - under the lease, the administrative rules, and the
common law - of the predecessor and successor landlords to any rent
owing under the commissioner's order; and the effect of the second
landlord's waiver of rent on any rights to rent of the original and pre-
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sent landlords. And in terms of client relationship issues, the case
raised difficult issues of counseling a very distrustful client. The client
had quite successfully waged a battle on her own against three different landlords for over three years, and was quite bewildered that she
now faced a $16,000 judgment with only a minimum-wage income.
She felt very angry that her fate was in the hands of third-year law
students.
The students delved into the case with great enthusiasm, mastering the file very quickly, immediately contacting the client, and plunging into legal research. But, almost from the beginning, I discovered
that I had to provide substantial direction both in terms of legal research and client counseling. The students simply did not have the
necessary knowledge of administrative law, judicial review, intervention doctrine, or court rules to develop strong procedural arguments.
And although their first-year courses had given them some background on the issues of waiver, rights of predecessor and successor
landlords, and statutory and lease construction, they still had difficulty
remembering what they learned in those classes and connecting it with
this particular case. I found myself teaching mini-seminars on most of
the issues and assigning specific research assignments. In regard to
client counseling, while the students tried to develop a good relationship with the client, she became even more distrustful of them when
they could not quickly answer her questions about the procedural posture of the case and the substantive issues in the case. Even with the
drafting of the brief, the students had difficulty. Both of them were
excellent writers, but the challenge raised by their lack of knowledge
of the legal issues not only slowed the process but made it difficult for
them to formulate cogent arguments. I eventually had to revise much
of the students' draft.
When the final draft was complete, I congratulated them on their
efforts and asked them to file the brief and draft a proof of service. I
was stunned by the response. They both responded, "What's a proof
of service?" And at that moment, I recognized the limitations of this
particular case as a vehicle for teaching legal problem solving. I had
spent three weeks in sessions with the students discussing fairly complex theories of administrative law and judicial review, the basics of
waiver doctrine, and different methods for counseling a distrustful client. But when it came to the simple task of filing their work product
properly with the court, they not only did not understand the concept
of "proof of service," but had no idea how to even engage in the basic
problem solving of determining its meaning. While the students were
lively participants in the case discussions, for the most part, the learning was as passive as in many law school courses. It struck me that the
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difficulty of tackling the basic doctrinal issues in the case made it unlikely that the students learned much from this experience about
problem solving in future cases.'
From this and other similar experiences, I have begun to explore
the issue of the relationship between a student's knowledge of the underlying legal doctrine in cases and her ability to learn effective methods of practice in a law school setting. One of the primary goals of
skills training in law school, especially clinical legal education, is to
teach students how to apply what they have learned in doctrinal
courses in the "real world."' 2 While much has been written about
training students in proper methods of practice and problem solving in
skills courses, 3 little attention has been paid to the significance of doctrinal knowledge to this training: the corpus of legal knowledge, if any,
that is necessary for such effective problem solving; the effects of limited doctrinal knowledge on the process of skills training; the implica1 That is not to say that the students' work on this case was a total failure as a learning
experience. I believe that the students did learn something about the particular legal theories involved through our discussions and their research of these issues. And certainly
there probably is an educational value to the students' experience of observing the crafting
of a brief, even if they are not the primary creators of the final product. See generally
Brook K. Baker, Learning to Fish, Fishing to Learn: Guided Participationin the Interpersonal Ecology of Practice,6 CLIN. L. REV. 1 (1999). One of my primary pedagogical goals,
however, is to have students learn problem-solving methods that they can eventually use in
their practice. The students' experience with this case did not fulfill that goal.
While it can be argued that this kind of case with a short deadline is an anomaly for
most housing clinics, many landlord/tenant disputes, by their very nature, involve fairly
complex doctrinal issues. Although most jurisdictions do not have a rent regulation system, even "routine" eviction cases can raise difficult issues involving procedural requirements precedent to the summary proceeding; special service of process rules; agency
theory; waiver and estoppel; lease and statutory construction; unconscionability; and common law covenants and warranties. Moreover, in most trial practice, a three-and-a-half
week deadline for the filing of a brief in a judicial review proceeding is not unusual. See
N.Y. C.P.L.R. 7804(c) (McKinney 1994).
2 Maureen E. Laflin, Toward the Making of Good Lawyers: How an Appellate Clinic
Satisfies the ProfessionalObjectives of the MacCrate Report, 33 GONZ. L. REV. 1, 27 (1998);
Steven Wizner, The Law School Clinic: Legal Education in the Interests of Justice, 70 FORDHAM L. REV. 1929, 1933 (2002).
3 See, e.g., Mark Neal Aaronson, We Ask You to Consider: Learning About Practical
Judgment in Lawyering, 4 CIiN. L. REV. 247 (1998); Janeen Kerper, Creative Problem
Solving vs. the Case Method: A Marvelous Adventure in which Winnie-the-Pooh Meets Mrs.
Palsgraf,34 CAL. W. L. REV. 351 (1998); Alan M. Lerner, Law & Lawyering in the Work
Place: Building Better Lawyers by Teaching Students to Exercise CriticalJudgment as Creative Problem Solvers, 32 AKRON L. REV. 107 (1999); Linda Morton, Legal Education:
Teaching Creative Problem Solving: A ParadigmaticApproach, 34 CAL. W. L. REV. 375
(1998); Richard K. Neumann, Jr., Donald Schon, the Reflective Practitioner,and the Comparative Failures of Legal Education, 6 CLIN. L. REV. 401 (2000); Kimberly E. O'Leary,
Using "Difference Analysis" to Teach Problem-Solving, 4 CLIN. L. REV. 65 (1997); Barbara
Stark, The Practiceof Law As Play, 30 GA. L. REV. 1005 (1996); Graham B. Strong, The
Lawyer's Left Hand: Nonanalytical Thought in the Practice of Law, 69 U. CoLo. L. REV.
759 (1998).
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tions of the need for an adequate doctrinal foundation to the
sequencing of courses in law school curriculum; case and problem selection in skills courses; and the demands made on students in these
courses to understand complex legal doctrine.
Cognitive psychologists posit that there are two important ways
to characterize the knowledge essential to the effective performance
of a task: (1) "domain knowledge," explicit knowledge of the concepts, principles, and structures of thinking about the particular domain in which the problem arises; and (2) tacit knowledge that cannot
be made verbal that involves how to do things. 4 Explicit knowledge
and tacit knowledge, they claim, are two separate forms of knowledge,
which are effected by different mechanisms and acquired through different experiences. 5 Understanding the interplay between these two
types of knowledge, they argue, is essential to comprehending how
6
professionals learn to practice and solve problems effectively.
In contrast to the field of legal education, in which very little consideration has been given to the relationship between domain knowledge and practice, 7 researchers in other areas of professional training
have begun to study this issue. Research has been conducted, for example, on the role of domain knowledge in creative problem solving
in the fields of accounting" and financial planning. 9 And a number of
4 Vimla L. Patel, Jos6 F. Arocha & David R. Kaufman, Expertise and Tacit Knowledge
in Medicine, in TACIT KNOWLEDGE IN PROFESSIONAL PRACTICE 75, 77-78 (Robert H.
Sternberg and Joseph A. Horvath, eds. 1999); Dennis J. Devine & Steve W.J. Kozlowski,
Domain-Specific Knowledge and Task Characteristicsin Decision Making, 64 ORGANIZATIONAL BEHAV. & HUM. DECISION PROCESSES 294 (1995) (distinguishing between "declar-

ative" and "procedural" knowledge). While the term "domain knowledge" does not
always have a precise meaning in the cognitive psychology literature, for purposes of this
paper, I use the definition in the text to differentiate it from the tacit knowledge used to
apply such knowledge in practice.
5 Patel et al., supra note 4, at 75-76.
6 Id. at 79.
7 One of the few articles which addresses the issue identifies the distinction between
explicit and tacit knowledge in the field of law, but provides little insight into the specific
interplay between domain knowledge and the practice of law. It merely concludes that,
"Knowing the detail of the law is not enough to make a legal expert." Garry Marchant &
John Robinson, Is Knowing the Tax Code All It Takes to be A Tax Expert? On the Develop-

ment of Legal Expertise, in TACIT KNOWLEDGE IN PROFESSIONAL
at 3, 17.

PRACTICE,

supra note 4,

8 G. Marchant, John Robinson, Urton Anderson & Michael Schadewold, Analogical
Transfer & Expertise in Legal Reasoning, 48 ORGANIZATIONAL BEH. & HUM. DECISION
PROCESSES 272 (1991).
9 Douglas A. Hershey, David A. Walsh, Stephen J. Read & Ada S. Chulef, The Effects
of Expertise on Financial Problem Solving: Evidence for Goal-Directed,Problem-Solving
Scripts, 46 ORGANIZATIONAL BEHAV. & HUM. DECISION PROCESSES 77 (1990). Substantial other research has been conducted on the effects of domain knowledge on problem
solving in contexts other than professional development. See generally Jennifer Wiley, Expertise As Mental Set: The Effects of Domain Knowledge in Creative Problem Solving, 26
MEMORY & COGNITION 716, 716-18 (1998) (reviewing studies on areas ranging from chess
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studies have been performed on this issue in the field of medical education for more than a decade, particularly by Vimla Patel and her
associates at McGill University's Centre for Medical Education. 10
While these researchers are far from unanimous in positing the precise
function of domain knowledge in professional practice, they have developed some helpful tentative theories on this issue.
The purpose of this article is to explore the psychological research on the relationship of domain knowledge and problem-solving

in practice, to apply it to an understanding of the role of doctrinal
knowledge in the practice of law, and to consider the implications of
this research on the training of law students in skills and clinical
courses. This article will first examine how recent legal scholarship on

problem solving in practice considers the role of legal doctrine in the
training process. It will then review psychological research in the areas of creativity training, problem solving, learning theory, and cognitive development to determine the present understanding of the
relationship between domain knowledge and the ability to problem
solve in practice. Then it will address the implications of this research
for the training of professionals with special attention to the education
of medical students. In light of this research, this article will then critique the current clinical literature on legal problem solving. Finally,
this article will propose some curricular changes in skills and clinical
to baseball expertise).
10 See, e.g., David R. Kaufman & Vimla L. Patel, The Nature of Expertise in the Clinical
Interview: Interactive Medical Problem Solving, in PROCEEDINGS OF THE TENTH ANNUAL
CONFERENCE OF THE COGNITIVE SCIENCE SOCIETY 461 (1988); Vimla L. Patel, David R.
Kaufman & Jos6 F. Arocha, Conceptual Change in the Biomedical and Health Sciences
Domain, in ADVANCES IN INSTRUCTIONAL PSYCHOLOGY (Robert Glasser ed., 2000) [hereinafter Patel et al., Conceptual Change]; Vimla L. Patel et al., supra note 4, at 75; Vimla
Patel & David R. Kaufman, Clinical Reasoning & Biomedical Knowledge: Implicationsfor
Teaching, in CLINICAL REASONING IN THE HEALTH PROFESSIONS 117 (Joy Higgs & Mark
Jones, eds. 1995); Vimla L. Patel & Guy J. Groen, The General & Specific Nature of Medical Expertise: A Critical Look, in TOWARD A GENERAL THEORY OF EXPERTISE 93 (K.
Anders Ericsson & Jacqui Smith, eds. 1991) [hereinafter Patel & Groen General & Specific
Nature]; Jos6 F. Arocha & Vimla L. Patel, Novice Diagnostic Reasoning in Medicine: Accounting for Evidence, 4 J. OF LEARNING SCI. 355 (1995); Henry P.A. Boshuizen & Henk
G. Schmidt, On the Role of Biomedical Knowledge in Clinical Reasoning by Experts, Intermediates and Novices, 16 COGNITIVE SCI. 153 (1992); Vimla Patel, Guy J. Groen &
Geoffrey R. Norman, Reasoning and Instruction in Medical Curricula, 10 COGNITION &
INSTRUCTION 335 (1993) [hereinafter Patel et al., Reasoning & Instruction]; Vimla. L. Patel
& Guy J. Groen, Developmental Accounts of the Transitionfrom Medical Student to Doctor: Some Problems and Suggestions 25 MED. ED. 527 (1991) [hereinafter Patel & Groen,
Developmental Accounts]; Vimla Patel, Guy J. Groen & Geoffrey R. Norman, Effects of
Conventional and Problem-Based Medical Curricula on Problem Solving, 66 ACADEMIC
MED. 380 (1991) [hereinafter Patel et al., Effects of Conventional and Problem-Based Curricula]; Vimla.L. Patel, Guy J. Groen & Jos6 F. Arocha, Medical Expertise As A Function
of Task Difficulty, 18 MEMORY AND COGNITION 394 (1990) [hereinafter Patel et al., Medical Expertise].
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programs to take into account the role that legal doctrine performs in
learning effective methods of legal practice.
The basic thesis of this article is that, consistent with the findings
in recent psychological studies, especially those in the field of medical
training, knowledge of substantive legal doctrine does have a significant function in learning effective legal practice, and that skills law
teachers, for the most part, have incorrectly downplayed that role.
Although some might argue that studies in fields such as
medicine are not relevant to legal practice, the differences between
learning medical and legal practice are not that substantial. Medical
knowledge consists of two different kinds of knowledge: basic sciences
(such as biochemistry, anatomy, and physiology) and clinical knowledge (learning which comes from applying basic scientific knowledge
to the treatment of patients in particular situations)., Clinical knowledge is not simply "hard science":
In hard science, the usual motive is inquiring: to gain a new understanding of some mechanism of nature.... In contrast, the care and

treatment of the individual patient is the ultimate, specific act that
characterizes a clinical physician .... The clinical physician, there-

fore, must take account of the immediacy of the problem confronting her for she bears an essential relationship to each patient.
Additionally, she has many human values to consider - ethics, compassion, and ...

2

a willingness to take responsibility in the face of

the unknown.'
Similarly, legal knowledge has two different aspects: basic knowledge of legal doctrine and principles (such as torts, contracts, property
law, and principles of legal reasoning) and clinical knowledge (learning derived from applying these doctrines in representing clients in
particular situations). 13 The legal practitioner, unlike the law professor, has to apply those doctrines in the context of a particular client in
14
a specific set of circumstances.
Because lawyers and doctors apply their knowledge in actual situations, the legal and medical domains are what cognitive psychologists
call "ill-structured":
(1) [t]he place to begin to define the problem is usually not clear;
(2) there often are many contingencies to take into account; (3) how
11 Patel & Groen, The General & Specific Nature, supra note 10, at 120; Patel & Kaufman, supra note 10, at 118.
12 Moore v. Ashland Chemical, 126 F.3d 679, 688 (5th Cir. 1997), overruled on other
grounds 151 F.3d 269 (5th Cir. 1998) (en banc) (citations omitted).
13

See

KARL

L.

LLEWELLYN, THE COMMON LAW TRADITION: DECIDING APPEALS

201-

203 (1960).
14 Llewellyn called this application of legal doctrine in practice, "situation-sense." Id.
at 121-26. See generally Aaronson, supra note 3, at 254-55.
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to weigh and assess the various interdependent variables is uncertain; (4) one has to continuously reframe and reconsider what one is
doing in light of new information and shifting calculations; and (5)
the goals to be sought are frequently subject to debate and refinement and are not usually susceptible to clear measurement.15
Resolution of such problems requires the use of both doctrinal and
clinical knowledge. Obviously, however, depending on the problem's
complexity, both legal and medical problems can span the spectrum
from minimally to very ill-structured.
The distinction between doctrinal and clinical knowledge has
been an important topic of debate in medical as well as legal education. Under the traditional medical school curriculum, students initially learned the basic sciences and considered simple clinical
problems in the context of idealized presentations in textbooks and
lectures. Clinical knowledge of how to deal with complex cases was
often learned in an unsystematic way by exposure to patients in hospitals. 16 This approach has been criticized by those who assert that basic
science is irrelevant to the future needs of practitioners. They argue
that, "[m]edical education should not be designed to develop scientists
nor students who are encyclopedias of scientific trivia, no matter how
vital that trivia might be in the pursuit of pure science. ' 17 Similarly, in
legal education the profession has engaged in a debate over the importance of traditional doctrinal education versus an emphasis on
skills training. Echoing the sentiments of their counterparts in medical education, some legal educators argue that, "Ours has thus become an educational system with the capacity to train highly
15 Aaronson, supra note 3, at 257 (observing "most perplexing and interesting lawyering situations involve what cognitive scientists would refer to as ill-structured
problems"); Ian Weinstein, Lawyering in the State of Nature: Instinct and Automaticity in
Legal Problem Solving, 23 VT. L. REV. 1, 9 (1998); Kaufman & Patel, supra note 10, at 462
(noting "[miedical problem solving has been described as an ill-structured task ... in which
...the goal state and the necessary constraints, are unknown at the beginning of the
problem-solving process").
Obviously, some medical problems are not ill-structured. A physician may treat a
patient with obvious symptoms who needs a routine regimen of care. In those situations,
the problem-solving process will not require careful assessment of alternative diagnoses,
and recovery will be subject to susceptible measurement. By the same token, however, not
all legal problems are ill-structured. A lawyer representing a client in the purchase of a
home will not need to use the same process as she might perform for a transaction involving a large-scale housing development. The important point is that ill-structured problems
arise in both the medical and legal settings; medicine is not simply the mechanical application of basic scientific knowledge.
16 Arocha & Patel, supra note 10, at 380.
17 Patel & Kaufman, supra note 10, at 118; Patel, et al., Conceptual Change, supra note
10, at 335-36 ("[Tlhe issue of where to shift the balance [between medicine as science and
medicine as a profession] has been the source of considerable controversy in medical education for most of this century.").
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accomplished law clerks, legal scholars, law review editors, and appellate advocates, but a system less well designed to train other kinds of
lawyers."18
Although the issue of domain and clinical knowledge exists in
both the medical and legal professions, some might argue that studies
of medical practice are still not applicable to the understanding of legal problem solving because the "effectiveness" of medical treatment
can be empirically verified much more accurately than the "effectiveness" of legal representation. In medicine, the effectiveness of a diagnosis and treatment plan for a particular patient can be assessed by
examination of the patient. 19 The legal environment, however, provides only limited opportunities for gauging objectively the effectiveness of a particular strategy or argument. Most legal arguments, for
example, never reach a court which could be the final arbiter of their
20
strength or weakness.
Even though legal practice, unlike medicine, often lacks the opportunity for objective measurement of efficacy, there are standards
for assessing effectiveness of legal problem-solving. The most obvious
gauge is the stated objective of the client. Under traditional ethical
rules, the success or failure of a legal course of action, argument or
strategy requires an examination of the client's goals in the situation,
not necessarily the judgment of a court or other third-party arbiter.2 '
The effectiveness of a lawyer's problem-solving, then, can be measured by focusing on the client's interests in a case, just as a physician's success in treating a patient can be assessed by examining the
needs of the patient. 22
18 Gary L. Blasi, What Lawyers Know: Lawyering Expertise, Cognitive Science, and the
Functions of Theory, 45 J. LEGAL EDUC. 313, 315 (1995).
19 See generally Patel et al., Conceptual Change, supra note 10, at 329. Even if a patient's condition becomes better, however, the reason for this improvement is not always
clear. To that extent, the difference between law and medicine may be less than usually
suggested.
20 Marchant & Robinson, supra note 7, at 16. Likewise, in medicine, even wrong diagnoses and wrong therapies still may lead to patient improvement. Moreover, unless a patient dies or becomes severely impaired, most medical decisions never come before a final
arbiter.
21 See MODEL CODE OF PROF'L RESPONSIBILITY DR 7-101(A)(1)(1980) ("A lawyer
shall not intentionally [flail to seek the lawful objectives of his client through reasonably
available means permitted by law ....");MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 1.2(a)
(1983) ( "A lawyer shall abide by a client's decision concerning the objectives of the representation .. .and shall consult with the client as to the means by which they are to be
pursued.").
22 Surprisingly, some of the literature on legal problem-solving ignores the issue of client goals. In one recent article, for example, the author describes a case where all AfricanAmerican first-grade students in an elementary school were assigned to the only AfricanAmerican first-grade teacher. Parents complained, and litigation was threatened. A lawsuit was averted when an African-American school board member proposed a solution
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THE ATTITUDE TOWARD DOMAIN KNOWLEDGE IN RECENT
LEGAL PROBLEM-SOLVING SCHOLARSHIP

Before examining the role that cognitive psychologists have discovered that domain knowledge plays in professional problem-solving, it is helpful to review the recent scholarship on teaching legal
problem-solving so that a comparison can be made between the theories advanced in that literature and the findings in the psychological
studies. For the most part, this legal scholarship is based on the personal experiences of the authors as skills or clinical teachers and not
on empirical studies in the law school setting.2 3 Moreover, the theoretical bases for much of this literature are psychological theories that
do not empirically consider the role of domain knowledge in the problem-solving process. 24 While such deficiencies do not totally undermine the approaches urged by these scholars, they do raise the issue of
whether these authors have considered adequately the role that legal
doctrine plays in training lawyers to be effective problem solvers.
The major theme of most of the recent scholarship on teaching
legal problem solving is that law schools focus too narrowly on legal
doctrine as the basis for devising solutions to clients' problems. As
one commentator has argued,
Traditional law school methods emphasize the study of appellate
cases, rules, statutes, and the procedures of the adversary method.
The lawyer's perceived role is to vindicate the client's individual interests. Conflict is viewed as a zero-sum game with rights and liabilities, and winners and losers. Advocacy and assertiveness are seen
as important skills.
Underlying the case method is a set of tacit assumptions which
maintaining the assigned classrooms but providing for joint activities among the classes.
Lerner, supra note 3, at 107. The author lauds the resolution as creative problem-solving
arguing that the case had "enormous potential to degenerate into litigation that might have
destroyed the community." Id. He bemoans the fact that, "none of the lawyers for any of
the interested parties had proposed a solution other that to which their clients were entitled." Id. at 108. While Lerner's assessment of the lawyers' representation may be correct
if the proposed solution in fact did meet their client's interests, he fails to address the issue
of whether the resolution did in fact meet those interests. As a policy matter, the averting
of a lawsuit may have been a benefit to the community and saved judicial resources. As a
legal representation matter, however, some African-American parents may have wanted a
public hearing of the issue and a definitive precedent barring such class assignments in the
future. A lawyer representing such parents would not be engaged in effective problemsolving if she proposed the compromise solution without her client's consent.
23 See, e.g., Aaronson, supra note 3; Baker, supra note 1; Lerner, supra note 3; But see
Weinstein, supra note 15 (comparing how experienced practitioners and law students handled a Social Security Disability case).
24 See, e.g., James M. Cooper, Towards a New Architecture: Creative Problem Solving &
the Evolution of Law, 34 CAL. W. L. REV. 297 (1998); Neumann, supra note 3; Strong,
supra note 3.
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significantly constrain the options a lawyer may consider in attempting to resolve a client's problem. Chief among these is the implicit
model of an adversary system based on rights and liabilities. Reasoning and decision making are seen as rule-based, in marked con25
trast to relational reasoning.
This rule-based approach to problem solving, these scholars contend, is too mechanical and distracts students from an examination of
how legal problems are actually resolved.2 6 Moreover, they argue, it
teaches students to become "gladiators," fixated on purely adversarial
solutions to problems. 2 7 Indeed, they even criticize the MacCrate Report, the ABA study promoting increased stress on problem-solving
skills in law schools, 28 because it "place[s] too much emphasis on
problem solving in the context of client-driven representation by indi'29
vidual lawyers."
Because of this misplaced focus on legal doctrine as the primary
tool for problem solving, these scholars assert, legal education ignores
the emotional and relational components of the lawyering process.
One commentator, for example, writes that the "[a]bstract analysis [of
traditional legal doctrine] reduces complexity by ignoring a portion of
it.... Judgments of emotion... involve the integration of information
from a wide variety of different sources and therefore may provide an
ideal example of holistic or integrative perceptual process. ' 30 Rather
than concentrating on the rights and liabilities of the positions of the
parties, these scholars assert, law schools should focus on the emotions, needs and interests of the parties to facilitate positive social relations between clients and the other parties. 31 As a result, they
argue, lawyers should be trained in methods for avoiding or prevent25 Kerper, supra note 3, at 353, 355 (1998).
26 Thomas D. Barton, Creative Problem Solving: Purpose, Meaning & Values, 34 CAL.
W. L. REV. 273, 283-85 (1998) ("The common law tends to approach human problems
with a flattened vision of humanity."); Neumann, supra note 3, at 404 ("In all professions,

the research emphasis on 'technical rationality' distracts everyone from an examination of
how professional problems are actually solved.").
27 Lerner, supra note 3, at 112; Barton, supra note 26, at 283-84 ("The common law
tends to approach human problems with a flattened vision of humanity by defining
problems as exclusively involving adversarial contests of rights.").
28 SECTION ON LEGAL EDUC.

&

ADMISSIONS TO THE BAR,

A.B.A,

LEGAL EDUCATION

(Report of the Task
Force on Law Schools and the Profession: Narrowing the Gap 1992).
29 Morton, supra note 3, at 377. See generally Carrie Menkel-Meadow, Narrowing the
AND PROFESSIONAL DEVELOPMENT - AN EDUCATIONAL CONTINUUM

Gap by Narrowing the Field: What's Missing from the MacCrate Report - Of Skills, Legal
Science, & Being A Human Being, 69 WASH. L. REV. 593 (1994).
30 Strong, supra note 3, at 776-77.

31 Barton, supra note 26, at 278 ("Tools for solving human problems are ... ethically
constrained by an underlying respect for individuals and their relationships."); Cooper,
supra note 24, at 306; Morton, supra note 3, at 377.
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ing conflict rather than encouraging it.32
In a similar vein, some of this recent scholarship criticizes law
school's focus on legal doctrine because it ignores the social and political context of people's problems. As one writer argues,
To achieve the levels of uniformity of process and results demanded
by Enlightened legal method, the inputs of the legal machine must
themselves be simplified and regularized. Hence, the human beings
who bring the disputes to the legal system cannot be regarded with
particularity or nuance. To maintain the neutrality and universal
rationality of legal process, the people behind the dispute must be
abstracted - consigned to a rather deep background. Only the overt
behaviors of people (and occasionally their "intentions") are considered important to the legal system. Humanity, with much
pounded out except behavior and intention, can then be fed through
legal rules for decisional processing, done impersonally and
33
uniformly.
As a result, the traditional method, such commentators assert, ignore
34
the voices of those who have historically been disadvantaged.
Finally, these scholars contend, legal education's emphasis on
doctrinal solutions stifles flexible and creative thinking. They note
that human interactions are not subject to mechanical rules, and that
"[t]he crisp, clean-edged solutions of logic games may not be available
to the law as it attempts to regulate the incidents of social relationships that are not wholly voluntary, and concerning aspects of life for
which there are no simple empirical truths. ' 35 Fixation on legal doctrine, they assert, encourages instrumental, inflexible approaches to
problem-solving that ignore the human context of legal cases. 36 In
contrast, creative legal problem solving, these scholars argue, requires
investigation into disciplines other than the law, 3 7 attempts to see the
32 Kerper, supra note 3, at 354 ("One of the most significant aspects of the lawyer's role
is assisting the client in building, maintaining, and strengthening positive relationships with
others to avoid or prevent conflict."); Linda Morton, Legal Education: Teaching Creative
Problem Solving: A ParadigmaticApproach, 34 CAL. W. L. REV. 375, 377 (1998).
33 See, e.g., Barton, supra note 26, at 285 (footnote omitted).
34 See, e.g., id. at 288; Martha L. Minow, Breaking the Law: Lawyers & Clients in Struggles for Social Change, 52 U. PiTT. L. REV. 723, 730-33 (1991).
35 See, e.g., Barton, supra note 26, at 283.
36 See, e.g., id. at. 273, 284. As Professor Barton notes, "Too often ... problems have
been defined exclusively by the procedures contemplated to solve the problem. Id. at 293.
See also Janet Weinstein & Linda Morton, Stuck in a Rut: The Role of Creative Thinking
Problem Solving and Legal Education, 9 CLIN. L. REV. 835, 841 (2003) ("[A] lawyer too
mired in legal reasoning may examine a personal injury case only from a legal point of
view: are there sufficient duty, breach, cause, and damages. A more expansive and useful
analysis would examine the case from the perspective of other disciplines, such as
medicine, psychology, and business.").
37 Morton, supra note 3, at 377-78.
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"whole picture," not just the position of the clients, 38 self-conscious
reflection, 39 and seeks to broaden the imagination beyond obvious
40
solutions.
To remedy what these scholars consider to be an undue emphasis
on legal doctrine in law school education, they propose a variety of

changes to the standard curriculum. Some commentators recommend
that law schools educate students to "dig into the real motivations of

each client" so that they can consider ways of resolving her problems
by methods other than traditional legal remedies. 4 1 Similarly, they
urge law teachers to train their students to "think outside the box": to
learn methods of creative and critical thinking and to use insights from
other disciplines to devise solutions to problems. 42 Others propose
38 Aaronson, supra note 3, at 251-52 ("One critical attribute shared by those whom I
regarded as good lawyers was their ability to see the whole situation - both the big picture
and the particular details. They also tended to have an accompanying strong sense - almost
an immediate sense - of what the danger points were and what were the likely options and
potential consequences of different courses of action. Furthermore, those lawyers whom I
admired seemed comfortable in taking into account and articulating rather quickly the
likely viewpoints and concerns of different participants.").
39 Morton, supra note 3, at 377.
40 Stark, supra note 3, at 1016-18.
41 See, e.g., Cooper, supra note 24, at 317; Morton, supra note 3, at 375. One writer,
for examples, relates:
My short-term goal in teaching a creative problem solving component in my
classes is to engage students in thinking processes in addition to that of legal analysis,

The problem I have used [in a clinical course] is based on an actual case. A
woman went inside a shoe store to return a pair of shoes which had broken the first
day she wore them. She explained to the manager that she had taken the shoes to a
shoe repair person, who explained to her that the shoes should not have broken as
they did. She asked the manager for another pair of the same style of shoes, a refund, or a store credit. The manager refused. When the woman complained of the
store's service to another customer, the manager came up to the complaining
woman, put his hand on her back, opened the door to the outside, and gently pushed
her out.
After narrating the story to my students, I ask them about their current
thoughts. Consistently, their immediate focus is the store's liability, and the patron's
possible causes of action. But, after discussing each phase of the model in the context of the hypothetical, the class comes to a different conclusion. First, students
identify and attempt to understand the problem ....
What are the client's real
interests? ... Who are the stakeholders? Is the problem part of a larger issue? What
societal interests might be involved? How, if at all, could the problem have been
prevented?
Id. at 384-85.
42 See, e.g., Mark Neal Aaronson, Thinking Like a Fox: Four OverlappingDomains of
Good Lawyering, 9 CLIN. L. REV. 1, 18 (2002); Cooper, supra note 24, at 317; Laurie
Morin & Louise Howells, The Reflective Judgment Project, 9 CLINICAL L. REV. 623, 628
(2003) (arguing that "[t]he creative problem solving model recognizes that human
problems rarely require only a legal solution, and that not all legal problems should result
in a lawsuit and adversarial positioning."); Morton, supra note 3, at 377-78 (1998);
Neumannn, supra note 3, at 418.
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the use of more "play" techniques - role playing and clinical work in
the "real" community - to assist students in the "massive integration
of doctrine and its application[s]. ' '43 Still others suggest that law
schools teach students to be sensitive to human differences so that
they can help their clients develop solutions which promote positive
44
relationships.
Although this scholarship faults legal education for its concentration on doctrinal solutions, it does recognize - usually grudgingly -

that legal doctrine plays some function in the lawyering process and
the training of law students. Typically, authors will include in their
criticism of legal education passages such as, "The case method should
be only one tool in the lawyer's tool box";4 5 "[tihe effective advocate,
like the able architect, knows but is not inflexibly constrained by doc-

trine";4 6 "[a]lthough we might agree that law school is an important,
perhaps even essential, step in learning certain conventions of analysis
and argumentation,

. .

. [a]ny reasonable view of enculturation [to the

legal profession] would permit, even encourage, exposure to other legal actors besides law professors.

47

These writers are silent, however,

on the issues of the amount of training in doctrine that is necessary to
be able to use it as a tool or the precise relationship between domain
48
knowledge and their "creative problem-solving" methods.

43 Stark, supra note 3, at 1010-14.
44 See Barton, supra note 26, at 288 (urging the teaching of creative problem solving
methods which "seek[ ] on a pragmatic basis to advance the values of inclusiveness, decentralized decision making, and respect for both human differences and the bonds of noncoercive relationships").
45 Kerper, supra note 3, at 355.
46 John Nivala, An Architecturefor Advocacy: A Sense of the Whole, 17 J. LEGAL PROF.
19, 43 (1992).
47 Baker, supra note 1, at 25 n.91. See also Morin & Howells, supra note 42, at 644 (in
advocating a "reflective judgment" model for clinics, authors state, "[w]e assume that
knowledge base and related experience are essential factors in the ability to engage in
effective reflection on complex client matters.").
48 Any discussion of the relationship between doctrinal knowledge and problem-solving usually addresses training students in methods they should not use. One commentator,
for example, argues, "Should we toss out the case method entirely? Definitely not. The
study of litigated disputes not only teaches the rules of law, but provides the reasoning to
show how and why the cases were won. Preventive law cannot be properly practiced until
the practitionerknows what must be prevented." Kerper, supra note 3, at 370-71 (1998)
(emphasis added).
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II.

COGNITIVE PSYCHOLOGY RESEARCH ON THE RELATIONSHIP
BETWEEN DOMAIN KNOWLEDGE AND CREATIVE
PROBLEM SOLVING

A.

Nature of Studies on the Relationship of Domain Knowledge
and Ability to Solve Problems

As noted previously, the recent negative attitude toward doctrine
in legal problem solving is not grounded in empirical studies or psychological theories on learning and performance that consider indepth the relationship between domain knowledge and the ability to
problem solve, but rather on personal experiences teaching law stu-

dents. Accordingly, an accurate assessment of this attitude and the
proposed curricular changes advocated by this scholarship requires an
examination of psychological studies that do specifically focus on this
relationship. These studies have been conducted in a number of dis-

tinct, but related areas. 49

First, studies have been conducted on the role of domain knowl-

edge in the creative process. 50 While much of the research in this field
has focused on the production of the exceptional works of a Mozart,
Michelangelo or Einstein, 5 1 other studies have considered the creative
process in solving "everyday" problems. 52 Whichever type of process
49 An excellent general discussion of the implications of cognitive psychology research
for legal education and problem solving is contained in Blasi, supra note 18. While Professor Blasi's essay, like the present article, recognizes the importance of structured knowledge to a professional's expertise, id. at 332-42, he does not address the issue of the limits
of teaching law students problem solving without an adequate foundation in this structured
knowledge
50 See generally TERESA M. AMABILE, CREATIVITY IN CONTEXT (1996); MIHALY CSIKSZENTMIHALYI, CREATIVITY: FLOW & THE PSYCHOLOGY OF DISCOVERY & INVENTION

(1996) [hereinafter,CsIKSZENrMHALYI, CREATIVITY];
MIHALY CSIKSZENTMIHALYI,
FLOW: THE PSYCHOLOGY OF OPTIMAL EXPERIENCE (1990) [hereinafter, CSIKSZENTMIHALYI, FLOW]; DAVID HENRY FELDMAN, MIHALY CSIKSZENTIMIHALYI, & HowARD GARDNER, CHANGING THE WORLD: A FRAMEWORK FOR THE STUDY OF CREATIVITY
(1993); Jerome Bruner, The Conditios of Creativity, in CoNTEMPORARY APPROACHES TO
CREATIVE THINKING 1 (Howard Gruber, Glenn Terrell, and Michael Wertheimer, eds.
1962); Beth A. Hennessey & Theresa M. Amabile, The Conditions of Creativity, in THE
NATURE OF CREATIVITY: CONTEMPORARY PSYCHOLOGICAL PERSPECTIVES

11

( Robert

J.

Sternberg, ed. 1988); Paul E. Tesluk, James L. Farr, & Stephanie R. Klein, Influences of
OrganizationalCulture & Climate on Individual Creativity, 31 J. CREATIVE BEHAVIOR 27

(1997).
51 See, e.g.,

CSIKSZENTMIHALYI, CREATIVITY,

supra note 50;

BREWSTER GHISELIN, THE

CREATIVE PROCESS (1952).
52 Arthur J. Cropley, Creativity and Cognition: Producing Effective Novelty? 21
ROEPER REV. 253, 254 (1999). See, e.g., Maria M. Clapham, Ideational Skills Training: A
Key Element in Creativity Training Programs, 10 CREATIVITY RES. J. 33 (1997); Maria
Maciejczyk Clapham & Donald Schuster, Can Engineering Students Be Trained To Think
Creatively? 26 J. CREATIVE BEHAVIOR 156 (1992); Robert W. Weisberg, Problem Solving

& Creativity, in THE NATURE OF CREATIVITY: CONTEMPORARY PSYCHOLOGICAL PERSPECTIVES, supra note 50, at 148. Indeed, some psychologists have argued that "the
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is considered, most researchers rely on a product definition for creativity: "A product is viewed as creative to that extent that [expert observers consider] it both a novel response and an appropriate, useful,
correct, or valuable response to an open-ended task."'53 Generally,
the methodology for this research has focused either on personal ob54
servations or interviews with subjects about their process of creation
55
or the effectiveness of creativity training programs.
A second set of studies has examined the relationship between
domain knowledge and the development of expertise.5 6 This research
has considered expert knowledge in the context of both highly structured domains such as chess and other games, 57 as well as ill-structured domains such as decision making. 58 The concept of an expert
"refers to an individual who surpasses competency in a domain .... A
domain expert ... possesses an extensive, accessible knowledge base
that is organized for use in practice and is tuned to the particular
problems at hand." 59 Consistent with this definition, researchers in
this area usually delineate a progression of development from novice
to expert. Vimla Patel, a prolific researcher on expertise in the medical profession, for example, has developed a detailed typology for the
levels of expertise in that profession: layperson; beginner; novice; intermediate; subexpert; and expert. 60 Studies on expertise include
comparative research on how novices and experts resolve hypothetical
problems, 6 1 as well as observations of how subjects with differing
62
levels of expertise perform in practice.
A final area of research that addresses the role of domain knowledge in problem solving is cognitive load theory. 63 Psychologists have
thought processes involved in the great creative acts are no different than those involved in
the things we do everyday." Id. at172
53 Hennessey & Amabile, supra note 50, at 14.
54 See, e.g., CSIKSZENTMIHALYI, CREATIVITY, supra note 50 (study based on video-

taped interviews with a group of ninety-one "exceptional" individuals).
55 See, e.g., Maria M. Chapman, IdeationalSkills Training:A Key Element in Creativity
Training Programs, 10 CREATIVITY RES. J.33 (1997).
56 See, e.g. ,Wiley, supra note 9.
57 See, e.g., id. (study of baseball knowledge). See generally Peter A. Frensch & Robert
J. Sternberg, Expertise and Intelligent Thinking: When Is It Worse to Know Better? in 5
ADVANCES IN THE PSYCHOLOGY OF HUMAN INTELLIGENCE 157, 161 (1989).

58 See supra note 15 and accompanying text.

59 Patel et al., supra note 4, at 79.
60 Id. at 80.
61 See, e.g., Hershey et al., supra note 9 (in financial planning field subjects with varying
experience decided whether a couple should open an Individual Retirement Account);
Patel et al., Reasoning and Instruction,supra note 10 (medical students at differing levels of

training diagnosed hypothetical patient).
62 See, e.g., Kaufman & Patel, supra note 10 (physicians and medical students at differing levels of training diagnosed volunteer patient).
63 See, e.g., Paul Chandler & John Sweller, Cognitive Load and Format of Instruction, 8
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found that the nervous system has definite limits on the amount of
information it can process at any given time. 64 Cognitive load theory
is concerned with the manner in which different cognitive resources
are used during learning and problem solving. 65 It posits that many
learning and problem-solving procedures created to facilitate skills acquisition actually impede learning because they place too many cognitive demands on students. 66 Accordingly, cognitive load theorists
submit that information should be presented to students in ways that
do not impose a heavy extraneous cognitive load. 67 In the context of
the issue addressed in this article, this theory raises significant questions about the possible cognitive overload when law students are required to learn both domain knowledge and problem-solving skills at
the same time.
B.

Domain Knowledge As A Prerequisiteto Effective
Problem Solving

The Comment to Model Rule 1.1 of the American Bar Association's Model Rules of Professional Conduct on competency of representation states, in part,
A newly admitted lawyer can be as competent as a practitioner with
long experience. Some important legal skills, such as the analysis of
precedent, the evaluation of evidence and legal drafting, are required in all legal problems. Perhaps the most fundamental legal
skill consists of determining what kind of legal problems a situation
may involve, a skill that necessarily transcends any particular specialized knowledge. A lawyer can provide adequate
representation
68
in a wholly novel field through necessary study.
As one attorney states in evaluating this comment,
This is a fudge, to be blunt. A lawyer who doesn't know the field
will not be competent to analyze precedent, evaluate evidence, or
draft documents; because the lawyer won't know what to look for,
the critical precedent won't be understood, the critical piece of evidence will remain undisturbed in the files, and the terms of the doc69
ument won't anticipate all that they should.
This observation is firmly supported by the psychological research on creativity and expertise. A person must have an adequate
COGNITION & INSTRUCTION

293 (1991).

64 See CSIKSZENTMIHALYI, FLOW, supra note 50, at 28.
65 Chandler & Sweller, supra note 63, at 294.
66 Id.
67 Id. at 295.
68 MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R.
69 Edmund S. Spaeth, Jr., What a Lawyer
PROFESSIONAL PRACTICE,

1.1 cmt. (1983).
Needs to Learn, in
supra note 4, at 21, 23.

TACIT KNOWLEDGE IN
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grasp of domain knowledge to be a creative or expert problem solver
in an area. 70 Obviously, a person needs to know music to write a symphony or must have a good grasp of nuclear physics to be creative in

that field. 71 By the same token, in ordinary professional situations, a
practitioner needs to acquire sufficient knowledge in a field to know

how to frame the question, evaluate information, generate options,
and execute a plan effectively.

Moreover, contrary to the implication of the comment to Model
Rule 1.1 that most legal problem-solving legal skills - analysis of precedent, the evaluation of evidence, and legal drafting - are totally independent of domain knowledge of the particular field of law, much
of the recent psychological research demonstrates context dependency

of such skills. The issue addressed by this research is whether creativity is rooted in general, domain-transcending cognitive processes or
whether it is "domain-specific.

' 72

Although the jury is still out on the

extent to which creativity is content specific, most studies suggest it is
moderately but not completely domain specific.

73

While these find-

ings give some support to the notion that certain lawyering skills transcend particular fields of law, they do not validate the suggestion of
Model Rule 1.1 that these skills somehow predominate over doctrinal
knowledge in the practice of law. The key issue, then, is determining
the precise role played by domain knowledge in the lawyering process.

70 In regard to creativity studies, see generally CSIKSZENTMIHALYI, CREATIVITY, supra
note 50, at 90 (discussing creativity, author observes, "You cannot transform a domain
unless you first thoroughly understand how it works"); Weisberg, supra note 52, at 155
("[R]esearch indicates that rather than being independent of past experience, truly efficient problem solving comes about only when an individual has acquired a deep knowledge
of the domain in question."). In the field of expertise research, see generally Wiley, supra
note 9, at 716 ("The possession of a large body of domain knowledge is central to expertise."); James Shanteau, Competence in Experts: The Role of Task Characteristics,53 ORGANIZATIONAL BEHAV. & HUM. DECISION PROCESSES 252, 256 (1992) ("Having an
adequate grasp of domain knowledge is obviously a prerequisite for being an expert.").
71 See AMABILE, supra note 50, at 86.

See generally MARK A. RUNCO & STEVEN PRITZKER, ENCYCLOPEDIA OF CREATIV292-94 (1999); John Baer, The Case for Domain Specificity of Creativity, 11 CREATIV-

72
ITY

ITY RES. J. 173 (1998); Frensch & Sternberg, supra note 57, at 160. But see Jonathan A.

Plucker, Beware of Simple Conclusions: The Case for Content Generality of Creativity, 11
CREATIVITY RES. J. 179 (1998).
73 Todd I. Lubart, Creativity, in THINKING & PROBLEM SOLVING 289, 293-94 (Robert J.
Steinberg, ed. 1994); Baer, supra note 72 (reviewing recent studies showing low correlations of creativity ratings in different areas (poetry, story-writing, mathematical puzzles,

collages, and drawings)).
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C. Roles Played By Domain Knowledge in Effective
Problem Solving
1.

Development of Problem-Solving Abilities

Recent psychological studies have rejected the simplistic notion
that the sheer amount of a person's domain knowledge leads to more
effective problem-solving in a field.74 And they have also discarded as
inadequate the view that expert problem-solving merely involves the
application of powerful search algorithms to a broad knowledge
store. 75 Experts in a particular area are not computers who merely
apply general problem-solving methods to the learning they have collected. Finally, most researchers have dismissed as simplistic the theory that problem-solving is simply a process of pattern recognition
based on domain knowledge and past experience. 76 They have concluded that it is not the amount of domain knowledge amassed, the
ability to apply problem-solving methods to that knowledge, or the
capacity to discover patterns similar to that knowledge that is crucial
to expert problem-solving. Rather, it is the way that domain knowl77
edge is organized.
Most cognitive psychologists now hypothesize that expert reasoning involves accessing certain problem-solving scripts or schemas for
handling particular problems. 78 These schemes, they hypothesize,
structure experts' knowledge so they can gain quick and easy access to
their memory and possible problem solutions. 79 Indeed, research
studies have shown that when experts face a new problem, they spend
significant time trying to assess the structure of the problem, presuma'80
bly attempting to match the situation with known "solution paths.
These schemes assist experts in reformulating problems to come
to a solution. Cognitive psychologists theorize that expert problemsolving is an incremental process in which experts first recognize similarities between a given problem and their stored knowledge about
past situations and then, when a proposed solution is found to be inadequate, reformulate the problem, attempt to retrieve additional inforSee Devine & Kozlowski, supra note 4.
See id. at 294 (discussing relationship of domain knowledge to expertise); AMABILE,
supra note 50, at 87 (1996) (examining relationship of domain knowledge and creativity).
76 See, e.g., Frensch & Sternberg, supra note 57, at 161; Patel & Groen, General &
Specific Nature, supra note 10, at 115.
77 See Frensch & Sternberg, supra note 57, at 161 (1989); Patel et al., Conceptual
74
75

Change, supra note 10, at 335; Wiley, supra note 9, at 716.
78 Hershey et al., supra note 9, at 80; Patel et al., Conceptual Change, supra note 10, at
335.

See Hershey, et al., supra note 9,at 80; Wiley, supra note 9, at 716-17.
80 See, e.g., Frensch & Sternberg, supra note 57, at 161.
79

CLINICAL LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 11:149

mation, and try to identify other solutions.81 Based on their domain
knowledge, they disregard irrelevant information and selectively attempt to gather further information. 82 When faced with a problem,

beginners believe they already know what the problem is, defining it
on the basis of its surface structure (its immediate, concrete, unique
properties). Experts, on the other hand, are more attuned to the deep

structure of the problem (its systematic properties) and seek to

83
reformulate it to reach a solution based on previous experience.
Obviously experts' schemas are developed from both their store
of domain knowledge and their past experience. In fact, studies have

shown that in routine situations experts rely less on domain knowledge in solving problems than on their past experiences handling similar situations. 84 This same research has suggested, however, that
domain knowledge is crucial in the learning of scripts and schemas.
Several studies, for example, in the area of medical education demon-

strate that students in their early years of development use their
knowledge of basic science in interpreting clinical information.
"[B]iomedical knowledge provides a reliable tool for forming a coher-

ent mental representation of a clinical case." However, this application of biomedical knowledge does not seem to endure. "The
transition to the next stage seems to be initiated by the effect of practical experience. '8 5 In other words, domain knowledge provides an organizing framework for development of expert schemas. "[W]ellorganized, coherent information is easier to remember than disjointed
81 See Patel & Groen, General & Specific Nature,supra note 10, at 106; Weisberg, supra
note 52, at 152; Cropley, supra note 52, at 258.
82 Patel et al., Reasoning and Instruction, supra note 10, at 339 (study of medical students showing that, if a comparison is made between beginning students and intermediate
students who have already been exposed to subject matter for some time, the intermediates utilize more information than either novices or experts. For novices, this can
be explained by a lack of knowledge. For experts, however, it seems to be attributable to
their ability to filter out irrelevant information. This use of irrelevant information by intermediates appears to be a sign that knowledge is becoming reorganized.).
83 Cropley, supra note 52, at 258-59. See also Kaufman & Patel, supra note 10, at 467.
Clinical law teachers have first-hand experience with this phenomenon on a regular basis.
A student will interview a client and, without examining the deep structure of the problem
(either the precise factual or procedural posture of the case), will identify a solution based
solely on the client's story or selected legal documents.
84 Patel & Kaufman, supra note 10, at 121 (observing that in the medical field "basic
science does not contribute directly to reasoning in clinical problem solving for experienced clinicians"). See also Patel & Groen, General & Specific Nature, supra note 10, at
114 (study in medical field showing that recall of relevant information is nonmonotonic, as
a function of diagnostic accuracy, with intermediates recalling more than experts).
85 Henry P. A. Boshuizen & Henk G. Schmidt, supra note 10, at 167 (emphasis in the
original). One study of medical education, for instance, found that second-year students
made extensive use of basic science knowledge. By their fourth year, students gave explanations which resembled expert physicians. Patel & Kaufman, supra note 10, at 121.
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collections of facts."' 86 Domain knowledge provides the mechaniza87
tion for understanding and identifying problem structure.
2.

Enhancement of ForwardReasoning

Closely related to the role of domain knowledge in the development of organization of schemas, another effect of well-organized domain knowledge in the problem-solving process is the enhancement of
forward reasoning. Cognitive psychologists distinguish between forward reasoning in which the problem solver works from given information to a hypothesis, and backward reasoning in which "the solver
identifies goals and then formulates different hypotheses to relate the
goals to the known information, working 'back' from the goals to find
a relationship that fits the known information. '88 In the medical field,
for instance, "Forward reasoning is characterized by drawing inferences from available data (e.g., a patient's symptoms) and sequentially
moving toward the solution of a problem without having to explicitly
test and evaluate hypotheses (e.g., medical diagnoses). ' 89 If a doctor
has seen the same kind of medical condition many times before, she
will likely use forward reasoning, recognizing important cues in the
patient's symptoms that will lead directly to a diagnosis. A novice
physician, however, will likely use backward reasoning, thinking
through the problem more explicitly, developing alternative hypotheses about the possible diagnoses, and testing out these theories with
the information discovered from the patient. 90 Forward reasoning
provides an efficient, natural way of approaching problems. While it
entails inductive thinking, backward reasoning is basically a deductive
process. 91
Research has demonstrated that forward reasoning is more typically associated with accurate problem-solving than backward reasoning.92 One study in the medical field, for example, compared the
performance of physicians from three specialties - cardiology, surgery,
and psychiatry - in diagnosing a cardiology case and then examined
the performance of endocrinologists and cardiologists in diagnosing
two other cases, one in the area of endocrinology and the other in the
area of cardiology. As would be expected, the specialists in the differ86

Id. at 126.

87 Patel et al., Conceptual Change, supra note 10, at 335.
88 Weinstein, supra note 15, at 27. See also Patel et al., Medical Expertise, supra note

10, at 394.
89 Patel et al., supra note 4, at 82.
90 Id.
91 Patel et al., Reasoning and Instruction, supra note 10, at 338.
92 See, e.g., Patel & Groen, General & Specific Nature, supra note 10.
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ent fields provided more accurate diagnoses than the nonspecialists. 9 3
Surprisingly, however, the data showed no difference in recall of relevant propositions between the specialists and nonspecialists. The accuracy of diagnosis then did not depend on the ability of the subjects
to distinguish between relevant and irrelevant information. 94 The
presence or absence of forward reasoning did, however, appear to be
strongly related to diagnostic accuracy. 95 In fact, all the subjects who
made completely accurate diagnoses used pure forward reasoning,
whereas none of the subjects who made inaccurate diagnoses used this
96
process.
The reason for this correlation between forward reasoning and
accurate problem solving appears to be the well-organized schematas
learned by experts. When confronted with a problem, experts use
these schemas - organized with their extensive knowledge of the domain - to structure the basic information and proceed forward to a
hypothesis. The novice solver, without an adequate foundation in domain knowledge, needs to first formulate different hypotheses and
then has to test them. 97 This process - backward reasoning - is
slower and, because it makes heavy demands on working memory, it is
98
less accurate than forward reasoning.
3.

Use of Contextual Information

Increased domain knowledge also facilitates problem-solving by
providing the solver with contextual information about the situation.
A problem can place a heavy burden on a person's cognitive processes
to organize, retain, and integrate all the given information. Domain
knowledge assists experts in categorizing and retaining this information and, by placing it in context, expedites the problem-solving
process. 99

Several empirical studies support this conclusion. One study,
comparing the handling of Social Security disability cases by experienced lawyers and law students, found that the students had difficulty
93 Id. at
94 Id.

101.

95 Id. at 102.
96 Id.
97 See Weinstein, supra note 15, at 26 (study comparing the handling of a Social Security case by experienced lawyers and law students found that one inexperienced solver
"sorted the facts into legal categories . . [but] [t]here was no evidence that she related the
legal ideas to each other to develop a theory of eligibility").
98 Patel & Groen, General & Specific Nature,supra note 10, at 94. Obviously, however,

in the absence of adequate domain knowledge, forward reasoning is highly error-prone.
Id.
99 Devine & Kozlowski, supra note 4, at 296.
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formulating even the basic issues in a case. 0 0 The study concluded,
Even the most basic goal identification can be a vexing problem for
an inexperienced legal thinker, who most needs to know, "how on
earth do I get started," but is least able to identify context defining
goals. The inexperienced solver can survey the range of possible
goals, but will most likely only identify substantive legal goals which
have little or no procedural information and provide little guidance
about how to reach the substantive aspect of the goal. 10 1
Similarly, the study found that the inexperienced solvers displayed a
lack of attention to the actual language of the law and imprecision in
their characterization of the facts of the case.10 2 These problems, the
study concluded, did not result simply from the fact that the experienced lawyers knew more law - both the experienced lawyers and
law students had been provided with the same legal materials and fact
problem - but more importantly from the law students' lack of contextual knowledge. 0 3 Without a larger context for interpreting the
regulatory language and facts, the inexperienced subjects faced substantial obstacles in their problem solving.
Similarly, another study in a different domain - the area of
medicine - demonstrates that sensitivity to contextual information is
critical for adequate diagnosis of patients. 10 4 In that study, researchers compared the accuracy of diagnosis by experienced doctors and
final-year medical students. After being shown certain information on
patient charts, the subjects were asked for the most likely diagnosis
and the information on which they relied to come to that opinion.
The study found that the superior diagnostic performance of the experienced physicians was accomplished by better recall of relevant
contextual information (e.g., the kind of diseases the patients have
suffered from in the past, the drugs they use or have been using, and
the nature of their work environment). 10 5 That contextual information is based both on the practitioners' past experience with other patients and their domain knowledge of the effects of other diseases,
drugs, and the environment on the body.
100 Weinstein, supra note 15, at 37-38.
101 Id. at 37.
102 Id. at 38.

103 Id. at 39. This problem is exacerbated by the increased usage of computer-based
research. In my experience, law students in clinical programs often will retrieve the applicable section of the statute or regulation on LEXIS or WESTLAW, but will fail to recover
the provisions that set the context for that section (e.g., a relevant definitions provision).
104 P.P.M. Hobus, H. G. Scmidt, H. P.A. Boshuizen & V. L. Patel, Contextual Factors in
the Activation of First Diagnostic Hypothesis: Expert-Novice Differences, 21 MED. ED. 471

(1987).
105 Id. at 465-76.
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4. Facilitating Communication
Not only does domain knowledge furnish contextual information
for problem solving, but it also provides a language for communicating with colleagues about problems. In many professions, including
legal practice, team decision-making is a regular occurrence. 10 6 Such
collaboration requires communication to formulate problems, organize tasks, coordinate responsibilities, and orchestrate actions. Domain
knowledge provides the common vocabulary for facilitating explanation and coherent communication. 10 7 While an expert, working on a
problem solely by herself, can rely on learned schemas for handling
the situation and does not have to make explicit the explanations for
her reasoning process, once she needs to coordinate her work with
colleagues, she needs to be able to explain her logic and actions. 108 As
one study described the role of domain knowledge in the field of
medicine, "An expert physician and team leader needs to be able to
articulate what would ordinarily be tacit knowledge as well as coaxing
other team members, when necessary, to make their assumptions as
explicit as possible so that they can be considered in the context of
treatment and management options." 10 9
5. Handling Difficult Cases
As described above, when experts engage in everyday problem
solving, they do not simply apply the stockpile of domain knowledge
they have learned to the problem but rely on learned schemas or
scripts, specific problem-solving strategies. 11 0 Cognitive psychologists
have found, however, that when the problem is not routine, but is difficult and uncertain, experts resort to their domain knowledge to
tackle the issues.1 1 Faced with such a problem, forward reasoning is
not helpful because the situation is not similar to previous cases, and
the expert must engage in backwards reasoning, developing and testing hypotheses.1 1 2 Just as domain knowledge helps practitioners com106 See Carrie Menkel Meadow, Aha? Is Creativity Possible in Legal Problem Solving &
Teachable in Legal Education, 6 HARV. NEGOT. L. REV. 97, 141 (2001).

107 Patel & Kaufman, supra note 10, at 126.
108 Patel & Groen, General & Specific Nature, supra note 10, at 107 (study showing that
expert physicians "did not use detailed scientific biomedical information during diagnostic
reasoning (forward reasoning). Physicians do not use this information in their everyday
practice, but they do appear to have it when probed for a biomedical explanation of a
problem.").
109 Patel et al., supra note 4, at 88-89 (observing that "[a]n effective clinical teacher [of
medical students] needs to be able to articulate knowledge that would normally be tacit for
a practitioner not engaged in instruction"). See infra notes 284-88 and accompanying text.
11oSee supra notes 78-83 and accompanying text.
111 Patel & Kaufman, supra note 10, at 121.
112 Patel et al., Conceptual Changes, supra note 10, at 387.
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municate with other colleagues in the collaborative process by giving
them a common vocabulary, it helps an expert who is facing a difficult
problem work it out by providing reference points for the decisionmaking process.
6. Developing Creative Solutions
Cognitive psychologists have also demonstrated that domain
knowledge plays a significant role in the creative process.1 1 3 As described above, they have distinguished between the creative products
of geniuses and everyday creativity, the ability of most normal brains
to develop novel and appropriate solutions to problems. 1 4 Researchers have found similarities in the processes used in both types of creativity, but, for purposes of this article, I will focus primarily on the
normative creativity used by professionals in the problem-solving
process.
In a number of books and articles, the cognitive psychologist, Mihaly Csikszentmihalyi has set forth his theory of "flow," the optimal
psychological experience that enhances, among other things, creativity.11 5 Csikszentmihalyi and his colleagues interviewed a large number of individuals who were considered "creative" in a variety of fields
and found a common thread:
Artists, athletes, composers, dancers, scientists, and peoples from all
walks of life, when they describe how it feels when they are doing
something that is worth doing for its own sake, use terms that are
interchangeable in their minutest details. This unanimity suggests
that order in consciousness produces a very specific experiential
state, so desirable that one wishes to replicate it as often as possible.
To this state, we have given the name of "flow," using a term that
many respondents used in their interviews to explain what the optimal experience felt like. 116
Flow - the enjoyment that comes from surpassing ourselves, from
mastering new obstacles, from making new discovery - motivates us
117
to creative activity.
113 For a definition of creativity see supra note 53 and accompanying text.
114 THOMAS B. WARD, STEVEN M. SMITH, & JYOTSNA VAID, CREATIVE THOUGHT: AN
INVESTIGATION OF CONCEPTUAL STRUCTURES AND PROCESSES 4 (1997).
115 See, e.g., CSIKSZENTMIHALYI, CREATIVITY, supra note 50; CSIKSZENTMIHALYI,
FLOW, supra note 50; Mihaly Csikszentmihalyi, Society, Culture, & Person:A Systems View

of Creativity, in

THE NATURE OF CREATIVITY: CONTEMPORARY PSYCHOLOGICAL PER-

SPECTIVES 325 (Robert J. Steinberg, ed. 1988).
116 Mihaly Csikszentmihalyi, The Flow Experience & Its Significance for Human Psychology, in OPTIMAL EXPERIENCE" PSYCHOLOGICAL STUDIES OF FLOW IN CONSCIOUSNESS
15, 29 (Mihaly Csikszentmihalyi & Isabella Selega Csikszentmihalyi, eds. 1988).
117 MIHALY

CSIKSZENTMIHALYI,

THE

EVOLVING

SELF

175-76 (1993);

CSIK-

SZENTMIHALYI, FLOW, supra note 50, at 74 ("In our studies, we found that every flow
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To experience flow, Csikszentmihalyi found, a person must become totally immersed in the activity. Flow transports us to a "new
reality," to a more complex self.1 18 To accomplish this transformation,

a person must pay close attention to her actions so she can monitor
feedback and concentrate on achieving her goals.' 19 Moreover, she

needs to enjoy herself by staying close to the "boundary between
boredom and anxiety. ''l 2° When there are too many demands, options, and challenges to handle, a person feels anxious and becomes

paralyzed; when there are too few, she becomes bored.' 2 ' That point
between boredom and anxiety allows for "convergent" thinking (conventional intelligence oriented to finding the one "correct" answer)
but also "divergent" thinking (the ability to produce a number of pos-

sible answers based on the available information). 22 The tension between these types of thinking evolves into a creative idea: holding on
23
to what is accepted but being open to new viewpoints and ideas.

Obviously, a strong grasp of domain knowledge is necessary for
conditions of flow. It is impossible for a person to pay close attention
to actions, monitor feedback, or concentrate on achieving goals if she
does not have a basic level of knowledge about the domain. 124 Without this knowledge, she will be unable to identify her ultimate goal,
grasp the important details on which she must focus, or recognize the
relevant information to use. Indeed, if a person is called upon to solve
a problem for which she does not have adequate domain knowledge,
activity, whether it involved competition, chance, or any other dimension of experience,
had this in common: It provided a sense of discovery, a creative feeling of transporting the
person into a new reality.").
118 CSIKSZENTImIHALYI, FLOW, supra note 50, at 74.
119 Id. at 210-12.
120 Id. at 54.
121 Id. at 228.
122 CSIKSZENTMIIHALYI, CREATIVITY, supra note 50, at 60. See generally Cropley, supra
note 52, at 254-55 (1999).
123 CSIKSZENTMIHALYI, CREATIVITY, supra note 50, at 103. Csikszentmihalyi calls the
creative thought inspired by this tension, "the AHA!" experience, the ability to discover a
new insight which a person knows is appropriate to the situation. Csikszentmihalyi also
reports that his respondents reported one other major factor underlying their creative
products: luck. Id. at 46. Unfortunately, that insight is not very helpful to this article.
124 Id. at 90 ("You cannot transform a domain unless you first thoroughly understand
how it works."). See id. at 7 (observing that "Edison's or Einstein's discoveries would be
inconceivable without the prior knowledge, without the intellectual and social network that
stimulated their thinking"). A few theorists have taken the view, based in part on selfreporting of the persons or myths about them, that creative insights spring from the minds
of geniuses almost spontaneously. See GHISELIN, supra note 51. Most psychologists, however, reject this view, acknowledging geniuses' extraordinary accomplishments in their
field but finding that the cognitive processes they used were ordinary: developing their
works based on the "influences" of their domain. See, e.g., Weisberg, supra note 52, at 16073 (noting that "[t]rue originality evolves as the individual goes beyond what others had
done before").
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she will likely become overcome by anxiety, and creative flow will be
inhibited. Moreover, unless a person has an adequate base of domain
knowledge, she cannot engage in the dual process of convergent and
divergent thinking. She may be able to brainstorm numerous novel
solutions to a problem but, without the ability to assess their efficacy
in handling the particular problem, she cannot determine whether
12 5
they are appropriate (convergent knowledge).
D. Domain Knowledge As A Hindrance to Effective
Problem Solving
"Experto credito" (Virgil, 19 B.C.)
"No lesson seems to be so deeply inculcated by the experience of
life as that you never should trust experts" (Lord Salisbury, 1877)126
These quotations are actually confirmed by two contrasting empirical findings in the cognitive psychology literature on the abilities of
experts. On the one hand, studies comparing problem solving (in areas such as medical diagnosis, physics, geometry, and computer programming) by experts and novices demonstrate that experts are
substantially more accurate than novices.1 27 On the other hand, research on judgment and decision making (in areas such as psychiatric
judgments, selecting graduate students, detecting accounting fraud,
predicting such things as the price of securities, bank failures, or the
weather), experts do not always perform better than novices. 128 The
difference in the findings of these two sets of studies depends in large
part on the way experts and novices process domain knowledge.
Precisely because experts have organized their domain knowledge through scripts and schematas, an expert can become vulnerable
to "fixation effects," inflexibility in approaching problems. 129 Although schemas can make the problem-solving process more efficient,
by proceduralizing (even routinizing) this process, they can limit the
130
knowledge selected for use and the number of variables considered.
In many everyday situations, a well-organized knowledge base is advantageous. But experts can be at a disadvantage when they are faced
125 See CSIKSZENTMIHALYI, CREATIVITY, supra note 50, at 60. In my experience, stu-

dents in a law school clinic often find it easy to brainstorm novel legal theories for a client's
case but, without an adequate knowledge of the legal doctrine involved, are unable to
assess their efficacy in the particular case.
126 Shanteau, supra note 70, at 252.
127 Devine & Kozlowski, supra note 4, at 295.
128 Id.

129 Frensch & Sternberg, supra note 57, at 176; Weinstein & Morton, supra note 36, at
869 (observing that "repeated use of specific thought processes and knowledge bases creates deep ruts"); Wiley, supra note 9, at 727.
130 Marchant et al., supra note 8, at 282; Hershey et al., supra note 9, at 98.
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with new information that is incompatible with their existing knowledge. 3 1 One study, for example, has shown that experienced accountants were less able to adapt to an exception to established tax law than
132
introductory tax students.
This issue of inflexibility can become especially significant when
an expert faces an inherently complex problem, 133 one in which the
goals are unclear and many contingencies need to be taken into account. Studies demonstrate that experts solve problems more effectively than novices when they are faced with well-structured problems
that can be easily addressed through their organized knowledge
base. 134 But when the problem is ill-structured, experts attempt to
add structure by making inferences and using their schemas to convert
the problem into a well-structured one that can be more easily
solved. 135 "[T]he necessary increase in cognitive activity required to
convert such a problem into a well-structured problem increases the
likelihood of error."'1 36 Indeed, an expert's attempt to restructure the
problem can lead to disregarding crucial variables.
Finally, domain knowledge can be a hindrance to recalling exact
information about a problem. Studies have shown that "intermediates" (persons between novices and experts, such as third-year
medical interns) can remember exact information about a problem
better than experts. 137 One study, for example, found that although
doctors are more accurate at diagnosing patients than upper-level
medical students, they are worse at remembering the exact information that was the basis of those diagnoses. 138 This difference arises
from the fact that experts process information through their
schematas while intermediates do not differentiate between relevant
39
and irrelevant infromation.1
III.

ROLE OF DOMAIN KNOWLEDGE IN LEARNING CREATIVE
PROBLEM SOLVING

The description in the previous section of the role that domain
knowledge plays in creative problem solving does not address the is131 Frensch & Sternberg, supra note 57, at 169.
132 Marchant et al., supra note 8, at 272. See Marchant & Robinson, supra note 7, at 15
(observing, "even in the legal environment, proceduralization may occur that blinds the
expert to the different or unusual circumstances that may occur)."
133 See supra notes 74-83 and accompanying text.
134 Wiley, supra note 9, at 717.
135 Devine & Kozlowski, supra note 4, at 295.
136 Id.
137 Wiley, supra note 9, at 716-17.
138 Id.

at 716.

139 See id. at 716-17.

Fall 2004] Domain Knowledge and the Teaching of Creative Legal Problem Solving

177

sue of the effectiveness of particular pedagogical methods in teaching
problem solving. The studies reviewed demonstrate that domain-specific knowledge plays a crucial role in organizing practical experience,
that it facilitates forward reasoning and thereby expedites the problem-solving process, that it assists in collaborative communication in
decision-making, helps in understanding difficult cases, and provides a
necessary basis for creative solutions. But they do not show how a
novice - a law student, medical student, or any other professional becomes an expert problem-solver in their field. A general weakness
in much expertise research is a focus on performance rather than the
learning process.
A.

Development from Novice to Intermediate to Expert

Research, especially in the field of medical education, demonstrates that novices, intermediates, and experts handle the information-gathering process in different ways. Novices engage in limited
data-gathering searches because they do not have a knowledge base to
support their searches. 140 In a study in the legal field, for example, the
researcher found that inexperienced problem-solvers attended to information in the order presented without an attempt to organize it.'4'
Intermediates, however, engage in a wide scope of information-gathering without screening out irrelevant information. 142 In other words,
they process too much garbage.' 43 Even if they have adequate prior
knowledge, they become distracted by irrelevant cues, identify unnecessary goals, and rely on extraneous portions of their knowledge
base. 144 Medical residents, for example, make far more differential
diagnoses, formulate more clinical findings, and generate more requests for unnecessary medical tests than students or senior doctors.1 45 Moreover, in patient interviews, residents make no attempt to
elaborate on the patient's complaint but present her with a series of
probes, asking for "yes" or "no" responses. 46 Experts, on the other
hand, use their schemas to screen out irrelevant information and develop fast and accurate solutions. 147 Unlike a medical resident, for
instance, a senior doctor in a patient interview uses her schematas to
reach a hypothesis of the patient's complaint and pursues an informa140 See, e.g., Patel & Groen, Developmental Accounts, supra note 10, at 530.
141 Weinstein, supra note 15, at 15.
142 See, e.g., Patel & Groen, General & Specific Nature, supra note 10, at 121; Patel &
Groen, Developmental Accounts, supra note 10, at 530-32.
143 Patel & Groen, Developmental Accounts, supra note 10, at 532.
144 Patel & Groen, General & Specific Nature, supra note 10, at 121
145 Patel & Groen, Developmental Accounts, supra note 10, at 530.
146 Id. at 532.
147 See, e.g., Kaufman

& Patel, supra note 10, at 532.

CLINICAL LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 11:149

tion-gathering agenda to confirm the diagnosis.
B.

Guiding Novices to Expertise

A crucial issue then becomes how to guide professional students
to higher levels of expertise. A number of significant studies on this
issue in the field of medical education have been conducted by Vimla
Patel and her colleagues at McGill University's Centre for Medical
Education. 148 They have compared the effectiveness of two different
medical school curricula in teaching problem solving at two Canadian
universities: McGill and McMaster. 149 At the time of the different
studies, McGill used a Conventional Curriculum ("CC") in which the
basic sciences were taught first in separate discipline-based courses,
and clinical exposure was given after about one-and-a-half years of
medical training.1 50 Illustrative clinical problems were used during the
first year-and-a-half, but the primary mode of teaching was didactic
presentation of basic science knowledge. 151 Only after students were
steeped in basic science doctrine were they introduced to the
problems raised by patient care.
McMaster uses a Problem-Based Learning curriculum ("PBL")
under which basic science is taught in the context of clinical
problems. 152 Students are introduced to patients within the first unit
of the curriculum and "are presented with a series of health care
problems requiring their solution, the understanding of underlying
physical, biological and behavioural principles, the appropriate collection of data and the critical appraisal of evidence."'1 5 3 Students ex148 See supra note 10.
149 See Patel et al., Effects of Conventionaland Problem-BasedMedical Curricula,supra

note 10, at 381. For a good survey of the general research comparing CC and PBL curricula, see Vimla Patel et al., Impact of UndergraduateMedical Training on Housestaff Problem Solving Performance: Implications for Health Education in Problem-Based Curricula,
65 J.DENTAL EDUC. 1199, 1199-2000 (2001).
150 Patel et al., Effects of Conventional and Problem-Based Medical Curricula, supra
note 10, at 381. Subsequent to these studies, McGill modified its curriculum to include
some problem-solving units in the first two years. See McGill UndergraduateMedical Education: Curriculum Introduction, at http://www.medicine.mcgill.ca/ugme/curricstructure.
htm.
151 See Patel et al., Reasoning and Instruction, supra note 10, at 336.
152 Patel et al., Effects of Conventional and Problem-Based Medical Curricula, supra
note 10, at 380. McMaster is a leader in PBL teaching. As the school touts on its website,
"Since the introduction of a problem-based learning (PBL) curriculum at the McMaster
University School of Medicine in 1969, many medical schools in different regions of the
world have adopted this approach .... Robert M.K.W. Lee & Chiu-Yin Kwan, Overview:
PBL, What is It?, at http://www.fhs.mcmaster.ca/mdprog/pbl/overview-pbl.htm.
153 McMaster University, Overview: Education Methods, at http://www.fhs.mcmaster.ca/
mdprog/overview/overviewedumethods.htm. For a current listing of the different units in
the curriculum, see McMaster University, Overview: Description of the Units, at http://
www.fhs.mcmaster.ca/mdprog/overview/overviewedumethods.htm.
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plore basic science and clinical subjects simultaneously without clear
distinctions between the two curricular components. 154 The curricu-

lum attempts to integrate these two components by teaching different
hypothetico-deductive problem-solving methods to be used in treating
a patient. 155 Additionally, instead of using the traditional lecture
method, McMaster emphasizes small-group learning and self-directed
15 6
learning methods.
In their studies, Patel and her colleagues have compared medical
school students and graduates from the two schools to determine
whether the different curricula affected reasoning characteristics and
knowledge used by students and physicians. In one set of studies, they
compared how medical students at McGill and McMaster at three dif-

ferent levels of training (first, second, and fourth years) utilized basic
science knowledge. They gave some students at each of these schools

a clinical case without the presentation of any additional information
and asked them for explanations of the case. They then gave other
students basic science material either immediately prior to or immedi-

ately after the presentation of a clinical case and asked them to explain the case in terms of that material. They then compared the types
of explanations given by the students taking into account their level of
157
study and their school's particular curriculum.
These studies demonstrated that students from the two schools
integrated basic scientific and clinical information about the patient
differently. 158 For the purposes of these studies, basic scientific information was considered to be explicit references by the subjects to the

biological sciences (e.g., physiology, pathophysiology, anatomy, and
biochemistry); clinical information was considered to be references to
154
155
156
note

Patel et al., supra note 149, at 1199.
See Patel et al., Conceptual Change, supra note 10, at 352.
Patel et al., Effects of Conventional and Problem-Based Medical Curricula, supra
10, at 380. On its current website, McMaster describes its use of these methods:
The central focus of the programme is the tutorial. The class is divided into small
groups, each with a tutor. In the tutorial session students develop a series of learning
objectives from each health-care problem and negotiate how they will approach their
learning tasks. They then acquire the knowledge and skills to meet the objectives of
the unit in which they are working. They also learn to work as a team, helping and
learning from their peers. The study habits and sense of responsibility to self and
others provides a basis for life long working and learning habits.
McMaster University, Overview: Education Methods, at http://www.fhs.mcmaster.ca/mdprog/overview/overviewedumethods.htm.
157 See, e.g., Patel & Kaufman, supra note 10, at 122; Patel et al., Reasoning and Instruction, supra note 10, at 335; Patel et al., Effects of Conventionaland Problem-Based Medical
Curricula,supra note 10, at 380.
158 Patel and her colleagues define "integration" as the "linking of biomedical and
clinical information into a coherent explanation, measured in terms of the number of biomedical concepts that are used to solve and explain a clinical problem." Patel et al.,
Conceptual Change, supra note 10, at 339.
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the patient's symptoms, signs, diseases without any explicit reference
159
to biological concepts.
When basic scientific information about the problem was provided before the clinical problem, students from both schools gave explanations that showed a lack of integration of basic science
knowledge into the clinical context. Their reasoning showed errors of
scientific fact, use of irrelevant as well as relevant information, a tendency toward circular reasoning, and, overall, a lack of coherence in
their knowledge structures. 160 But when the clinical problem was
given on its own, without the presentation of any other information,
PBL subjects - including beginning students - used rather detailed

biomedical information in their explanations while CC subjects used
more clinical than biomedical information.16 ' And when the scientific
information was given after the clinical problem, students from both
schools integrated basic scientific concepts into the clinical context,
but PBL students demonstrated better integration than CC students. 162 Reflecting their contrasting curricula, CC students did not
integrate basic science and clinical information in their explanations
163
while PBL students did engage in such integration.
Based on these data, Patel and her colleagues concluded that the
two schools inculcated their students in quite different patterns of reasoning. For CC students (except beginning ones), basic science information was not used spontaneously in giving explanations of patients'
problems. 164 Specifically, despite the scientific orientation of their initial curriculum, when confronted with the clinical problem alone, CC
students focused more on clinical information than biomedical information in their explanations, and when given the scientific materials
after the problem, they were less prone to integrate their scientific
knowledge into their explanations. Like expert physicians, they
showed a preponderance of forward reasoning, generating fewer elaborations than PBL subjects. 165 And like experts, they only used basic
scientific concepts when they experienced difficulty with the patient
problem or were asked to give globally-coherent explanations of the
166
patient problem.
PBL students, however, were unable to separate basic science and
159 See id. at 338.
160 Id. at 340; Patel et al., Reasoning and Instruction, supra note 10, at 374.

161 Patel et al., Conceptual Change, supra note 10, at 340; Patel et al., Reasoning and
Instruction, supra note 10, at 354-63.
162 Patel et al., Conceptual Change, supra note 10, at 340-41.
163 Id. at

341.

164 Id.
165 Id. at 342.
166 Id. at 341.
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clinical knowledge. Explanations provided by PBL students, regardless of whether they used basic science or not, contained the
same detailed descriptions of biomedical information to account for
analogous problems that actually involved different pathophysiological mechanisms. Also, examination of PBL students' semantic
representations of their clinical case explanations showed that, besides basic science and clinical knowledge relevant to the problems,
they contained a large amount of additional knowledge that was unrelated to the problems. In this regard, PBL seems to promote a
type of learning in which basic biomedical knowledge becomes so
tightly tied to specific clinical problems that it becomes difficult to
167
separate them.
Because of this integration, PBL students generated a greater number
of elaborations of a problem than CC students, including a greater
amount of irrelevant information when they interpreted the features
of the problem. 168 This tendency, the researchers assert, reflects the
hypothetico-deductive method in the PBL curriculum, under which
students are introduced to different problem-solving methods and are
asked to brainstorm alternative diagnosis hypotheses and elaborate on
each aspect of a diagnosis. 169 Indeed, the PBL subjects were prone to
use backwards reasoning in their explanations, working from hypothe170
ses to data.
Expanding on these studies, Patel and her associates then examined whether or not these differences in patterns of reasoning survived beyond medical school. To address this issue, they investigated
the utilization of basic science concepts by medical residents from the
two schools to determine whether the differences found in their research with medical students would be sustained after some years of
clinical practice. 171 In this study they gave the subjects a booklet containing the actual patient charts for two patients containing three segments: clinical history, physical examination, and laboratory data.
After the presentation of each segment, the subjects were requested
to write their thoughts. Then the subjects were asked to summarize
the complete patient problem, give a differential diagnosis, suggest a
167

Id.

Id.; Patel et al., Reasoning and Instruction, supra note 10, at 374.
Patel et al., Conceptual Change, supra note 10, at 341; Patel et al., supra note 4, at 93
Patel et al., Effects of Conventional and Problem-Based Medical Curricula,supra note 10,
at 387 (observing that the PBL students "had learned a systematic process of thinking that
was explicitly taught. The predominance of backward reasoning, the systematic use of
clinical information, and the tendency to formulate extensive elaborations are all consistent with the notion that the students were generating diagnostic explanations through the
use of hypothetico-deductive reasoning.").
170 Patel et al., Conceptual Change, supra note 10, at 342.
171 See id. at 343.
168

169
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therapeutic and patient management plan, and explain the underlying
pathophysiology of the case. 172 The researchers then analyzed the
data focusing on the reasoning process used by the subjects from dif173
ferent schools.
Remarkably, the results of this study mirrored the findings of the
medical student research. Residents from a CC program used more
clinical concepts in their explanations than those from a PBL program. CC residents also displayed a greater use of forward reasoning
than PBL residents, and PBL residents showed a greater tendency for
backward reasoning and greater elaborations. 174 These findings show,
therefore, that the different curricula can have long-term effects on
the reasoning process of the school's students.
Based on these studies, Patel and her colleagues hypothesize that
the PBL approach may actually hinder the acquisition of forward reasoning by students. 175 As described previously, forward-directed reasoning, based on a highly-organized knowledge base, enables an
expert to solve problems efficiently and effectively. 176 Patel and her
associates suggest that by teaching basic scientific concepts in the abstract, CC curricula may foster the development of efficient forward
reasoning by giving their students a well-organized knowledge base
with which to organize their clinical experiences. 177 PBL curricula, on
the other hand, by integrating basic science and clinical information
early in students' education and focusing on specific problem-solving
methods, encourage "the development of a causal reasoning pattern,
in detriment of a clinically driven knowledge base" and may result in
limited acquisition of necessary expert scripts 178 Such curricula encourage the development of the less efficient mode of backwards reasoning, an effect that can last several years, if not longer, into a
physician's practice.
Moreover, the Patel studies indicate that because CC students
learn basic sciences separately from the clinical context, they master it
better than their CC counterparts. In the medical student studies, for
example, the explanations of the PBL students were frequently of less
quality than those of CC students. 179 They often contained errors of
Id. at 344-45.
For the specific procedure used for analyzing the reasoning process used by the subjects, see id. at 345-46.
174 Id. at 343-50.
175 Id. at 351.
176 See supra notes 88-97 and accompanying text.
177 Patel et al., Conceptual Change, supra note 10, at 351.
178 Id. at 352-52; Patel et al., supra note 4, at 93 (commenting, "[F]orward reasoning
seems to result from an adequate organization of knowledge, rather than from the deployment of explicitly learned reasoning or problem-solving strategies.").
179 Patel et al., Reasoning and Instruction, supra note 10, at 374.
172
173
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scientific fact and flawed patterns of explanation, such as circular reasoning.' 8 0 With inadequate knowledge schemas, PBL students may be
less able than CC students to transfer knowledge from one case to
another.18 1
Patel and her associates observe that the PBL curriculum ignores
the fact that basic science knowledge and clinical knowledge are two
separate knowledge structures.
[C]linical knowledge is based on a complex taxonomy that relates
disease symptoms to underlying pathology. In contrast, the biomedical sciences are based on general principles defining chains of
causal mechanisms. Thus, learning to explain how a set of sympbe different from learning
toms is consistent with a diagnosis may
182
how to explain what causes a disease.
The CC curriculum ensures that basic science concepts are learned
extremely well, which assists the students in developing through practice the taxonomy to relate disease symptoms to underlying pathology
and in providing them with the necessary biomedical knowledge to
communicate with colleagues and handle difficult cases. 183 The PBL
curriculum, on the other hand, by conflating the two modes of reasoning, may make it extremely difficult for students to master the basic
184
scientific knowledge needed to engage in expert clinical reasoning.
The one possible negative consequence of the CC curriculum
identified by Patel and her associates is the problem inherent in for180 Patel et al., Conceptual Change, supra note 10, at 342; Patel et al., Effects of Conventional and Problem-Based Medical Curricula, supra note 10, at 387.
181 Patel et al., Conceptual Change, supra note 10, at 351-52 (observing that, "the students and residents in a PBL school may exhibit restricted patterns of transfer wherein the
understanding of biomedical concepts are context bound").
The Patel studies, especially those in regard to reasoning by medical students, are
subject to criticism because many McMaster subjects lacked previous scientific experience
before attending medical school. Patel et al., Reasoning & Instruction, supra note 10, at
374; see McMaster University, Admissions: Q & A About Admissions, at http://www.
fhs.mcmaster.ca/mdprog/admissions/admissions-qanda.htm. This explanation for the discrepancy between PBL and CC students, however, is unlikely "because the pattern of errors in scientific explanation is uniform across PBL students, regardless of scientific
background." Patel et al., Reasoning and Instruction, supra note 10, at 364. Moreover, all
of the studies are subject to close scrutiny because of the limited number of subjects involved. See, e.g., id. at 345 (one experiment comparing eighteen students from each school
and the other experiment focusing on thirty-six students). The findings of this research,
however, are sufficiently robust that they at least support the tentative hypotheses of the
researchers.
182 Patel et al., Reasoning and Instruction, supra note 10, at 375.
183 See Patel & Kaufman, supra note 10, at 126 (noting, "Perhaps the key role played by
basic science may not be in facilitating clinical reasoning per se, but in facilitating explanation and coherent communication.... Basic science provides a powerful means of connecting disparate phenomena and of generating explanations that, if still inaccurate, are much
more coherent."); Patel et al., Reasoning and Instruction, supra note 10, at 375.
184 Patel et al., Reasoning and Instruction, supra note 10, at 375.
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ward reasoning: scripted problem-solving. 185 When forward reasoning
is used, errors in reasoning are difficult to eradicate because of the
highly patterned problem-solving process. "Once an explanation is
found for a case, CC-trained subjects seem to use the 'satisficing"
principle that stops any further processing of the case. ' 186 PBL students, on the other hand, while prone to making errors of fact, are
more likely to revise their explanations and learn from experience as
they correct their errors. 18 7 To remedy this problem for CC students,
the Patel team suggests that students be taught strategies to exploit
the knowledge they have learned in more effective ways, for instance,
188
methods for explicitly generating sets of related hypotheses.
C. Problem-Solving Methods and Cognitive Load
The Patel research demonstrates not only that PBL students
trained in backward reasoning continue to use such an approach in
practice, but also that they appear to master the basic sciences less
effectively than CC students. PBL students have fewer opportunities
to develop a solid conceptual foundation. This latter finding, investi189
gators hypothesize, could be caused by problems of cognitive load.
As discussed earlier, cognitive psychologists have found that
humans have limited attention and processing capabilities. 90 Cognitive load theory posits that there are significant constraints on the cognitive resources that can be used during learning and problem
solving. 19 1 Under this theory, if the instructional format requires students to engage in cognitive activities that are irrelevant to the pedagogical goals, knowledge acquisition can be impeded. 192 Accordingly,
information should be presented in the teaching process in ways that
1 93
do not impose a heavy extraneous cognitive load.
The problems raised by cognitive load are reflected in several
studies of the effectiveness of using specific problem-solving techniques in the learning process. 194 That research found that the use of
185 See supra notes 88-96 and accompanying text.
186 Patel et al., Conceptual Change, supra note 10, at 352.
187 Id.

188 Arocha & Patel, supra note 10, at 380.
189 Patel et al., Conceptual Change, supra note 10, at 342.
190 See supra note 64 and accompanying text; CSIKSZENTMIHALYI, FLOW, supra note 50,
at 28-29 (observing that, "It seems we can manage at most seven bits of information - such
as differentiated sounds, or visual stimulus, or recognizable nuances if emotion or thought
- at any one time").

191 Chandler & Sweller, supra note 63, at 294.
192 Id.
193 Id. at 295.

194 See, e.g., id. at 294; John Sweller, Cognitive Load During Problem Solving: Effects on

Learning, 12 COGNITIVE Sci. 257 (1988); Chandler & Sweller, supra note 63, at 294.

Fall 2004] Domain Knowledge and the Teaching of Creative Legal Problem Solving

185

some goal-directed search heuristics such as means-ends analysis,
while facilitating problem solution, can create extraneous cognitive
load and actually interfere with learning. 195 Subjects could solve
problems, and in some cases repeatedly solve problems, but remain
unaware of the essential structural features of the problem. 196 As two

of these researchers assert, "[S]earching for suitable problem-solving
operators is cognitively demanding and directs attention away from
1 97
aspects of the problem important to learning."'
Pointing to this research, Patel and her colleagues hypothesize

that the PBL curriculum's use of specific problem-solving methods
may interfere with adequate learning of abstract biomedical concepts.1 9 8 As discussed above, basic scientific knowledge and clinical
knowledge are two different modes of cognition. 199 When students

are asked to learn domain knowledge and problem-solving clinical
techniques at the same time, their attentional resources are strained.
They, therefore, may not be able to master the necessary basic scientific knowledge as effectively as students in the CC program. 200
IV.
A.

DOMAIN KNOWLEDGE AND THE TRAINING OF LAWYERS

The Role of Domain Knowledge in the Practice of Law

The cognitive psychology studies on expertise and creativity have
significant implications for the training of lawyers. Legal knowledge,

like its medical counterpart, has two components: explicit knowledge
of legal doctrine and tacit knowledge of the skills necessary to represent a client effectively. 20 1 As the psychological research demonstrates, these two types of knowledge are distinct but both are
essential to the practice of the profession.2 0 2 While lawyers may not
explicitly consider legal doctrine in the context of practice, it forms
the basis for their actions and reasoning process. Indeed, without
195 Sweller, supra note 194, at 260.
196 Chandler & Sweller, supra note 63, at 294.
197

Id.

198 Patel et al., Conceptual Change, supra note 10, at 342.
199 See supra notes 11-12 and accompanying text.
200 Patel et al., Conceptual Change, supra note 10, at 335.
201 Since a substantial part of legal doctrine is developed in practice - through court
cases, the legislative and administrative process, and professional custom - an argument
can be made that legal doctrine is fundamentally different from the basic science doctrine
taught in medical schools. Without entering into the philosophical debate whether "abstract" legal doctrine actually exists in the same way that the physical and chemical properties of basic science exist, suffice it to say, lawyers and decision-makers practice our
profession as if there is such a doctrine. See Maureen Cain, The Symbol Traders, in LAWYERS IN A POSTMODERN WORLD: TRANSLATION & TRANSGRESSION 19 (Maureen Cain &

Christine B. Harrington, eds. 1994).
202 See supra notes 11-14 and accompanying text.
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doctrinal knowledge, lawyers cannot adequately organize their experiences and become effective professionals in solving their clients'
20 3
problems.
Accordingly, some of the barbs thrown at legal education by recent commentators on legal problem solving do not give adequate attention to the crucial role played by legal doctrine in the practice of
law. The argument, for example, that rule-based training ignores the
relational process 20 4 disregards the fact that a lawyer's relationship
with a client, an adversary, or a decision maker is organized around, at
least initially, rule-based schemas. Similarly, the contention that doctrinal training stifles creative and flexible thinking20 5 ignores the fact
that creative products originate from a solid base of domain knowledge, not independent of it. A person must learn how to think inside
the box before venturing to think outside of it. Although obviously
improvements can be made in legal education to train students to become more sensitive to relational issues, the voices of the disadvantaged, and the opportunities for nonadversarial approaches to conflict
resolution, the psychological research on expert problem-solving demonstrates that such improvements must take into account the significance of domain knowledge in the practice of law.
An examination of a few of the skills performed by attorneys
clearly illustrate this point. In client interviewing, for example, a lawyer has a number of goals: (1) to form an attorney-client relationship;
(2) to determine the client's goals; (3) to gather as much as the client
knows about the facts surrounding her problem; and (4) to reduce the
client's anxiety without being unrealistic. 20 6 Development of rapport
with the client is certainly an important factor in achieving these goals.
A lawyer will be most effective in the interview if she has ability to
make the client feel comfortable, to encourage the client to communicate freely, and to remove inhibitions to communication, such as authority, cultural, psychological, or social barriers.20 7 Realization of the
ultimate goals of the interview, however, and, to a certain extent, the
ability to establish rapport with the client, depends in large part on the
knowledge base the lawyer brings to the interview. The development
of a lawyer-client relationship requires a grasp of the contractual, fidu203 See supra note 84-87 and accompanying text.
204 See supra notes 25-29 and accompanying text.
205 See supra notes 35-36 and accompanying text.
206 STEFAN H. KRIEGER & RICHARD K. NEUMANN,

JR., ESSENTIAL LAWYERING SKILLS:

INTERVIEWING, COUNSELING, NEGOTIATION, AND PERSUASIVE FACT ANALYSIS

80-81 (2d

ed. 2003).
207 Id. at 65-66. See generally Gay Gellhorn, Law and Language:An Empirically-Based
Model for the Opening Moments of Client Interviews, 4 CLIN. L. REV. 321, 321-23 (1988)
(describing stresses faced by a client coming to an initial interview).
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ciary, and ethical obligations inherent in such a relationship. 20 8 Determination of the client's goals entails an understanding of the legal
remedies available and procedural requirements in the particular
2 09
situation.
Similarly, fact-gathering involves inquiries based in large part on
doctrinal knowledge. While some of the probing process at an interview is based simply on common sense notions of what should have
happened next in the situation,21 0 adequate questioning necessitates a
good understanding of what is supposed to happen next in similar situ211
ations under established substantive doctrine or procedural rules.
Indeed, it is the much-maligned abstraction of legal rules that facilitates this process. Moreover, a legally sufficient story of the case cannot be fully developed from the client without an understanding of
evidentiary rules concerning relevancy, authenticity, competency, and
credibility.2 12 Finally, factual inquiry to develop possible legal theories is difficult, if not impossible, without a fairly substantial knowledge base. In order to identify the facts necessary to support a legal
claim or defense (in either a transactional or litigation context), a lawyer obviously needs to have a grasp of the relevant elements that must
213
be established.
Although the final goal of a client interview - reducing the client's anxiety without being unrealistic - appears to concern primarily
issues of rapport, lawyers cannot achieve this goal without some
knowledge base. An attorney can certainly attempt to allay a client's
fears without an understanding of legal doctrine, but, without this
knowledge, it will be impossible for her to communicate realistic expectations of what might happen in the case, let alone what steps she
will take in the representation. Indeed, much of the literature urging
law schools to train lawyers to be sensitive to client emotions and
needs disregards the fact that the client, by coming to a lawyer in the
208

See

CHARLES W.

WOLFRAM, MODERN LEGAL ETHICS

145-48 (1986).

209 Many commentators have contended that lawyers unwisely limit their examination
of client relief solely to legal remedies. See, e.g., Menkel-Meadow, supra note 106, at 106.
Although these arguments have validity, the converse is also obviously true: lawyers should
not limit their considerations of relief to nonlegal remedies. Indeed, some of the most
effective solutions to a client's problem might result from a creative blend of legal and
nonlegal relief.
210

See

DAVID A.

BINDER, PAUL BERGMAN,

& SUSAN C. PRICE, LAWYERS As COUN-

132-33 (1991); KRIEGER & NEUMANN., supra note 206, at 147-48.
211 In a mortgage foreclosure case, for example, without a rudimentary understanding of
the doctrine concerning real estate contracts and financing, preconditions to foreclosure,
and court procedural rules, a lawyer's interview of the client in the case will be very
ineffective.
212 See FED. R. EVID. 401-15; 602; 608-609; 901-902.
213 See BINDER ET AL., supra note 210, at 146-53 (1991); KRIEGER & NEUMANN, supra
note 206, at 175-78.
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first place, wants expert assistance. 214
Besides client interviewing, another example of the essential role
played by legal doctrine in the lawyering process is legal negotiation.
Much of the recent skills literature on this subject focuses on the need
for interest-based "problem-solving" approaches to negotiation,
rather than the rule-based "adversarial" methods. 2 15 Under the problem-solving model, each side is assumed to bring something of value
to the deal that can create benefits to both parties, and the lawyers
attempt to develop creative solutions - beyond traditional legal remedies - to integrate the resources of each party. 2 16 Although such an
approach has obvious advantages, 217 the use of problem-solving negotiation methods does not render legal rules or doctrine irrelevant.
Both transactional and litigation negotiation occur in "the shadow of
the law."'2 18 While parties to a negotiation usually bring non-legal interests to the table, they frequently do not ignore the legal rights,
claims, and defenses context within which the interests reside. Oftentimes, in fact, as hard as a lawyer might try to encourage her opponent
to engage in problem-solving negotiation, her adversary will refuse.
In such circumstances, the lawyer needs to be able to rely on the legal
rules - either to respond to the opponent on his own adversarial turf
or to convince him of the strength of her case to prod him into using a
problem-solving approach. 219 In fact, most legal negotiations are not
purely adversarial or problem-solving but are a mixture of both. Indeed, these rules themselves create value. And, even if both parties
participate in the problem-solving process, the generation of options
for integrating the parties' interests can be facilitated by considering
variations to traditional legal remedies. Finally, in both transactional
and litigation negotiations, procedural deadlines, prerequisites, and
requirements often provide either constraints or opportunities for
each party's leverage. Without an adequate understanding of those
issues, a lawyer cannot be an effective negotiator.
214 See, e.g., Barton, supra note 26, at 279. Indeed, in the case described at the beginning of this article, the students' lack of a firm grasp of the relevant legal doctrine in the
case increased the client's anxiety and interfered with effective client counseling.
215 Carrie Menkel-Meadow, Toward Another View of Legal Negotiation: The Structure
of Problem Solving, 31 UCLA L. REV. 754 (1984). See also Menkel-Meadow, supra note
106, at 106 (bemoaning the fact that "[d]ispute negotiation often looks for its solutions
among the legal precdents or outcomes thought likely in the 'shadow of the courthouse'
216 KRIEGER & NEUMANN, supra note 206, at 274.
217 For an examination of the circumstances when the different negotiation approaches
are most appropriate, see id. at 255-58.
218 See Robert H. Mnookin & Lewis Kornhauser, Bargainingin the Shadow of the Law:
the Case of Divorce, 88 YALE L.J. 950 (1979).
219 KRIEGER & NEUMANN, supra note 206, at 330-31.
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These descriptions of the role played by legal doctrine in interviewing and negotiation are just two of the many examples of the significance of domain knowledge in the context of the lawyering
process. As the cognition research demonstrates, however, this
knowledge is not explicitly applied by expert lawyers in practice. 220
When interviewing clients, for example, they do not usually articulate
- either to themselves or their clients - the ethical rules for formation

of an attorney-client relationship, the legal elements for the theories
they are exploring, or the evidentiary rules for establishing a legally
sufficient story. Likewise, in a negotiation, while expert attorneys
might argue specific statutory or case authority, in most cases, they
develop their arguments without explicitly accessing underlying doctrine. In practice, expert lawyers will use tacit knowledge - their
schemas - for responding to particular information provided by clients, adversaries, or decision makers.221
Cognitive studies indicate that the successful utilization of tacit
knowledge rests on invoking well-formed explicit knowledge structures. 222 Explicit knowledge does not provide professionals with pat
"scripts" to use in particular situations; rather it gives them a structure to organize their actual experiences in practice to develop their
tacit knowledge base. Legal rules in a specific subject matter area
provide the framework for examining any legal problem in that area.
Accordingly, the development of effective lawyering "schemas" whether they are for interviewing, counseling, negotiation, fact investigation, or trial preparation - rests on a firm understanding of legal
doctrine. Additionally, domain knowledge provides attorneys with
tools for handling difficult cases. By providing a common reference
point, it assists lawyers at all levels of expertise - from novice to intermediate to expert - in solving difficult problems. When faced with a
case for which their schemas are inadequate, attorneys can use their
legal doctrine base to develop legal research strategies, to refine their
arguments, or to consider ways of expanding or narrowing the law. 223
Moreover, by providing a common language, legal doctrine helps facilitate communication between colleagues and their adversaries in
their search for solutions to difficult problems. 224

See supra notes 78-83 and accompanying texts.
See id.
222 See, e.g., Patel et al., supra note 4, at 77-79.
223 See supra notes 110-12 and accompanying text.
224 See supra 106-109 and accompanying text.
220
221

CLINICAL LAW REVIEW

B.

[Vol. 11:149

The Role of Domain Knowledge in Present Skills
Training Methods

The fact that legal doctrine plays a significant role in structuring a
lawyer's practical experience refutes somewhat the argument that the
traditional law school curriculum's focus on appellate cases, rules,
statutes, and the procedures of the adversary method is based on
"flawed premises. ' 225 But recognizing that substantive legal doctrine
is essential to expert problem solving does not address the issue of the
most effective methods for training students how to apply that doctrine in practice. Tentative answers to that question can be found by
examining the research on expert performance, especially the Patel
studies on medical education. Obviously, there are problems with applying this research to the legal setting: although similar in some respects, the medical and legal reasoning processes are not identical; 226
the curricula in law and medical schools have some substantive differences; 22 7 and the Patel studies themselves have some methodological
weaknesses. 228 To begin to answer fully the question of the role of
domain knowledge in legal skills training, empirical studies need to be
conducted in the law school setting.2 29 In the meantime, however, the
Patel studies and others on expert learning are useful for making some
tentative observations about some of the methods presently used for
skills training in law schools.
1.

Brainstorming and Other Problem-Solving Methods

Much of the literature on teaching legal problem solving strongly
recommends the use of brainstorming and other heuristic devices to
encourage student creative problem solving.2 30 As one text advises
students,
225 Kerper, supra note 3, at 352-53. Professor Kerper acknowledges that the case
method should be a "tool in the lawyer's toolbox," id. at 355, but downplays the significance of the role it plays in the lawyering process.
226 See supra notes 11-14 and accompanying text.
227 See Roger C. Cramton, ProfessionalEducation in Medicine and Law: StructuralDifferences, Common Failings, Possible Opportunities, 34 CLEV. ST. L. REV. 349, 352-53

(1986).
228 See supra note 179, at 341-42.
229 In fact, Vimla Patel and David Kaufman, one of her associates for her medical school
studies, and I are now developing such a research project in the context of legal education.
230 See, e.g., ROGER S. HAYDOCK, PETER B. KNAPP, ANN JUERGENS, DAVID HERR &
JEFFREY STEMPEL, LAWYERING: PRACTICE AND PLANNING 25-27 (1996); Michael McDon-

nell, Playing Beyond the Rules: A Realistic and Rhetoric-Based Approach to Researching
the Law and Solving Legal Problems, 67 UMKC L. REV. 285, 308-10 (1998); Menkel-

Meadow, supra note 106 at 135-36 (encouraging teachers in conventional courses "to teach
alternative ways of structuring and solving legal problems" and to "push students to look
for multiple possiblities and directions that [a] case could have taken"); O'Leary, supra
note 3, at 65, 94-95.
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When a client brings a legal problem to a lawyer and asks for advice, one approach to dealing with the problem will usually occur to
the lawyer fairly quickly. This "first thought" approach may be obvious or subtle. It may be the standard approach; it may be the
approach the lawyer used before; it may be the least costly approach; it may be the easiest approach. Whatever its merits, this
"first thought" approach has one significant drawback. The first
thought may stifle any second thought or third thought. Rather
than attempting to think of alternatives, the lawyer may focus efforts on perfecting and implementing the first thought.
Novice lawyers in particular need to resist this impulse. The
first thought may possibly be the best, but there is no way of knowing that unless the lawyer has second and third thoughts as well....
The assumption that the first thought approach isn't available is important because it forces the lawyer to think seriously about other
23 1
alternatives.
Accordingly, students (and novice lawyers) are urged to suspend
judgment and create hypotheses about alternative solutions to the
problem by "reverse thinking, random stimulation, developing original analogies, and brainstorming. ' 232 In fact, students' inexperience is
considered a value because their "freshness... [can] generate creative
solutions to problems that more seasoned attorneys might overlook in
'233
favor of well-worn habits.
Although no one can dispute the virtues of teaching students to
develop creative, alternative solutions to legal problems, the cognitive
psychology studies raise serious questions whether encouraging students to engage in brainstorming and similar techniques achieves that
goal. Obviously, because most students are hampered by their limited
knowledge of the law and inexperience, their ability to engage in extensive brainstorming in a simulation or clinical course is very limited
and can be very time-consuming. 234 But more importantly, the studies
suggest that teaching students to use routinely hypothetico-deductive
problem-solving techniques trains them in the less efficient and effec235
tive methods of backward reasoning.
As discussed previously, research in the field of medical educa231 HAYDOCK ET AL., supra note 230, at 26.

232 McDonnell, supra note 230, at 309.
233 See Katherine R. Kruse, Biting Off What They Can Chew: Strategies for Involving
Students in Problem-Solving Beyond Individual Client Representation, 8 CLIN. L. REV. 405,

427 (2002).
234 See id. at 427 (2002) (observing in regard to clinical courses, "By limiting the students' work to a single type of case, area of law, or small number of clients, law school
clinics can make the time and space for the students' learning curve to catch up with the
creativity of their imaginations.").
235 See supra notes 162-68 and accompanying text.
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tion shows that doctors trained in programs that encourage the rou-

tine use of brainstorming alternative hypotheses and elaboration on
each aspect of a diagnosis are prone to backward reasoning in their
practice.2 36 Especially when they have an inadequate grounding in
basic biomedical concepts, students in these programs have the tendency to consider a greater amount of irrelevant information and to
render inaccurate diagnoses compared to their counterparts trained in
conventional programs. 237 These studies suggest that law students

who are taught to use brainstorming as a regular method for problem
238
solving may become prone to backward reasoning in their practices.
While in some difficult or out-of-the ordinary cases, exacting deduc-

tive reasoning, involving full-fledged hypotheses generation and evaluation may be required, the use of such an approach on a routine
basis can be highly inefficient and ineffective. 2 39 Providing students

with a firm doctrinal base and training them how to use that knowledge to organize their practical experience may be more helpful in

training them for the forward reasoning required in regular practice. 240 In other words, it may be better to teach students how to de-

velop effective "first thoughts" about different cases than how to
brainstorm second and third thoughts about cases in a subject area in
which they lack adequate domain knowledge. Understanding the

problem may be more important than developing alternative hypotheses for solving it.
Moreover, the psychological studies indicate that teaching brainSee id.
See supra note 166 and accompanying text.
A distinction exists, of course, between the impact of a curriculum with a few skills
courses encouraging the routine use of a backward reasoning approach and the effect of an
entire curriculum geared to teaching problem-solving methods. Empirical research would
be necessary to assess the differences. The possible negative effects of only a few such
courses, however, cannot be downplayed if students' only exposure to skills training encourages the use of hypothetico-deductive methods.
239 In an often-quoted passage, Donald Schon, a distinguished professor of education at
Massachusetts Institute of Technology gave some anecdotal evidence of the number of
cases handled by physicians that they consider out-of-the ordinary: "Doctors do vary about
what this percentage is: I have never heard it lower than thirty percent or higher than
eighty percent, but I have heard it put at eighty percent by someone whom I regard as a
very good doctor." Donald A. Schon, Essay: Educatingthe Reflective Legal Practitioner,2
CLIN. L. Rav. 231, 239 (1995). These data, however, do not support teaching students
brainstorming and other heuristic devices as the normative approach to legal problem solving. Taking the midpoint between Schon's thirty and eighty percent, at least half of most
physician's caseloads are "by the book" and can be addressed by standard expert forward
reasoning. More importantly, these data do not show that the best method for teaching
problem solving to novice practitioners, especially those with a limited knowledge base, is
training them in these techniques. While students certainly need to be aware of the dangers of "scripted" practice and the values of deductive techniques in some cases, they also
need to learn the importance of developing their forward-reasoning skills.
240 See supra notes 169-76 and accompanying text.
236
237
238
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storming and similar techniques to law students without adequate doctrinal knowledge may actually impede skills acquisition. As described
previously, if an instructional format places too heavy a cognitive load
on students, their learning will be adversely affected. 241 With law
school skills training courses, if students are asked to brainstorm or
use other problem-solving techniques in doctrinal areas in which they
have limited exposure and in which they must perform extensive legal
research, these studies suggest that the burden on their mental
processes may actually obstruct learning both the doctrine and the
techniques. Brainstorming alternative theories of liability in a negligence case certainly makes substantially more cognitive demands on a
law student than it does on an experienced personal injury lawyer.
Although such problem-solving techniques may theoretically appear
advantageous to learning, they have the potential for inhibiting it.
In a similar vein, research suggests that use of such heuristic devices may even impede the creative process. As the research of Mihaly Csikszentmihalyi illustrates, creative flow usually occurs when
persons have a chance of completing the task. 242 If students lack the
adequate knowledge base to engage effectively in brainstorming, the
anxiety of both thoroughly researching a new area of the law and
brainstorming theories within it has the potential for obstructing the
creative process. Students, faced with a brainstorming assignment in
an area in which they lack solid doctrinal or contextual knowledge,
may feel daunted in any quest to develop "fresh" solutions to
problems.
2.

Teaching Creative Problem Solving in the First Year

During the past fifteen years, a number of law schools have established first-year "lawyering" courses to introduce students at the beginning of their careers to some of the essential skills used by
attorneys: interviewing, counseling, and negotiation. 243 Some of these
courses focus primarily on providing students with some of the "nuts
and bolts" issues raised in performing these skills. Others, however,
concentrate on training these students to become "creative problem
241 See supra notes 189-90 and accompanying text.
242 CSIKSZENTMIIHALYI, FLOW, supra note 50 at 49; see supra notes 114-24 and accompanying text.
243 See, e.g., Margaret Martin Berry, Jon C. Dubin & Peter A. Joy, Clinical Education
for this Millennium: The Third Wave, 7 CLIN. L. REV. 1, 41-44 (2000); Kate O'Neill, Adding
an Alternative Dispute Resulution (ADR) Perspectiveto a TraditionalLegal Writing Course,
1998 FLA. L. REV. 709 (1998); Franklin M. Schulz, Teaching "Lawyering" to First-Year Law
Students: An Experiment in ConstructingLegal Competence, 52 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 1643

(1996).
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solvers. ' 244 Cognitive research raises serious questions about the limits of teaching problem solving to students with such limited knowledge of legal doctrine.
A good illustration of some of the possible problems raised by
lawyering courses which focus on teaching problem-solving is a firstyear elective course, "Law & Lawyering in the Work Place," described
at length in an article by Alan Lerner. 245 Lerner asserts that, "the
heart of what lawyers do is the exercise of critical judgment" 246 and
defines the mission of the course as teaching "students to exercise critical judgment in addressing problems framed or constrained by the
law, and to act creatively as transformative problem solvers, rather
than solely as 'gladiators."'

247

Students in the course handled simu-

lated workplace cases (primarily in the area of employment discrimination) and were assigned roles of one of the interested parties or
counsel in each problem. The problems were constructed, Lerner
notes, "so that seeking a resolution through litigation was not likely to
'248
produce a satisfactory solution.
Lerner acknowledges that the substantive law applicable to these
cases "was complex, charged with political and emotional content, and
constantly evolving.

' 249

Indeed, the cases raised complex Title VII

issues and required some understanding of recent, and evolving, Supreme Court precedent. 2 50 To address this problem, before any simulation, the instructors provided students with copies of the relevant
cases so that they would "understand the law well enough to be able
to use it to address the problem called for in their roles and to use the
simulation as a platform from which to build further insights into the
implications of the applicable legal rules.

'25 1

Factual context was pro-

vided through non-legal readings and "guest" lawyers and other
professionals.

252

244 Compare University of New Mexico School of Law, Courses Descriptions:Lawyering
Process, at http://lawschool.unm.edu/curriculum/1l/descriptions/(introduction to different
lawyering skills) with Lerner, supra note 3 ("Law & Lawyering in the Work Place" course
focusing on teaching problem solving). See generally Menkel-Meadow, supra note 106, at
142 (proposing, "[instead of a repetitive diet of common law courses ... the first-year
should introduce students to a variety of forms of legal reasoning and intelligences, including common law, statutory drafting and interpretation, Constitutional law ... some introduction to another discipline ... and some exposure to a real world legal problem ... and
some exposure to the now [sic] multiple intelligences of legal research... .
245 Lerner, supra note 3, at 107.
246
247
248

Id. at 111.
Id. at 112.
Id. at 118.

249

Id. at 117.

250 See id. at 135-38.
251 Id. at 137.
252

Id. at 118.
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While Lerner's statement of course mission is certainly admirable, his description of this course illustrates some of the potential pitfalls of teaching problem solving to first-year students, especially in
the context of complex legal cases. The model for problem solving
presented in this course is significantly different from the approach
used by experts. As the psychological research demonstrates, experts
do not approach most problems by first learning the doctrine relevant
to a particular area and then applying it.253 Rather, they rely on schemata developed from their experience, organized by a solid knowledge base. 254 Especially in an area like employment discrimination
law, which raises complex issues of administrative law,2 55 statutory interpretation, 256 burden-shifting, 2 57 evidentiary proof,258 and expert
testimony, 259 such a knowledge base is not attained through quickie
classes and readings but through a foundation in basic tort, procedural, and evidence law, and such schemas are not developed from one
or two cases. Indeed, it is hard to reconcile the course's stated mission
of teaching the "exercise of critical judgment" with the assertion that
students are asked to creatively problem solve each simulation after
being given materials so they understand the law "well enough" to
handle it.
Moreover, this course raises serious question about the cognitive
load demands on the students. By requiring students to learn the
complexities of employment discrimination law at the same time that
they are learning "lawyering skills" in which they have virtually no
experience, it is highly likely that their learning of either the doctrine
or the skills is impeded. 260 In fact, Lerner acknowledges that a number of student evaluations of the course expressed insecurity about the
inadequate foundation they received in legal doctrine and requested
more discussions and lectures to help them feel comfortable with the
law. 261 Lerner's response that he had confidence that the students did
learn the applicable law does not address the issue whether they
learned enough about the law or skills to transfer their knowledge into
other cases. Additionally, the insecurity (anxiety) expressed at least
on the part of some students could actually inhibit the student's exer253 See supra notes 74-75 and accompanying text.

254 See supra notes 78-83 and accompanying text.
255 See, e.g., 2 BARBARA LINDEMAN & PAUL GROSSMAN,
TION LAW 1205-73 (3d ed. 1996).

256
257
258
259
260

See, e.g., id. at
See, e.g., id. at
See, e.g., id. at
See, e.g., id. at
See supra note

1282-89.
13-39.
10-44.
88-106.
190 and accompanying text.

261 Lerner, supra note 3, at 141.
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cise of critical judgment touted as a major goal of the course. 262
3.

Teaching Problem-Solving in Clinical Courses

While the literature on clinical legal education is replete with suggested methods for teaching problem solving in the context of liveclient clinics, 2 63 little attention has been paid to the cognitive limitations of such approaches to student learning. 264 As with Lerner's firstyear simulation course, laudable course objectives are articulated and
creative teaching approaches and assignments are described. But the
issue of whether or not students are actually learning processes of
problem solving that can be used in actual practice is rarely addressed.
In a recent article, for example, Mark Aaronson relies on Hannah
Arendt's lectures on Kant's political philosophy to describe his goal of
teaching students "practical judgment. '26 5 Lawyers who exercise such
judgment, he asserts, have the ability to "see the whole situation both the big picture and the particular details. They also tended to
have an accompanying strong sense- almost an immediate sense - of
what the danger points were and what were the likely options and
consequences of different courses of action." 266 While recognizing the
pedagogical problems of teaching such a fairly complicated human
quality in a live-client clinic, he still maintains that "it is an objective
'267
that can be met so long as the expectations are reasonable.
The course Aaronson describes is an individual representation,
single-semester civil clinic. The clinic handles cases in a number of
subject matter areas: Social Security disability appeals, rent regulation
disputes, special education administrative hearings, and employee
wage disputes. 26 8 Students usually have responsibility for two cases in
two different subject areas. 269 In the clinic, students are expected to
spend at least an average of sixteen hours of work each week on their
cases. 270 Using the case experiences as the primary course material,
Aaronson articulates four organizing themes for the course: "(1) lawyering as an interpersonal social activity, (2) problem solving under
conditions of uncertainty, (3) the lawyer's role as an intermediary, and
See supra note 123 and accompanying text.
See, e.g., Kruse, supra note 233; Andrea M. Seislstad, Community Building as a
Means of Teaching Creative, Cooperative,and Complex Problem Solving in Clinical Legal
Education, 8 CLIN. L. REV. 445 (2002).
264 But see Baker, supra note 1.
265 Aaronson, supra note 3, at 247.
266 Id. at 251-52.
267 Id. at 287.
268 Id. at 307-308.
269 Id. at 307.
270 Id. at 309.
262
263
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(4) the overriding significance of context."'2 71 These themes, he contends, bear directly on the exercise of practical judgment in
272
lawyering.
Aaraonson describes the pedagogy in the clinic as "active learning": "almost all of what they learn in the Clinic comes from their own
experiences, writings, responses to readings, and discussions with
others. '2 73 Supervision is framed around the organizing themes of the
course, such as the need for both empathy and detachment with cli274
ents, as well as the development of conventional lawyering skills.
Student progress depends, Aaronson observes, on how well students
275
can "recall and apply relevant knowledge.
In his evaluation of the course, Aaronson acknowledges,
"[n]otwithstanding that a major objective is to help law students become problem-solving lawyers, only so much can be accomplished in a
single clinical semester.

The breadth of material that has to be

presented is too vast."'276 Aaronson, however, does not explain satisfactorily why this breadth has to be so vast. He suggests that the main
reason for this "overload of information" is the "constant demand on
students not just to act but to act reflectively. ' 277 But he provides no
rationale for the need for a clinic with multiple subject matter areas or
for a course requirement that students handle cases in two different
areas. Nor does he adequately explain why the demand on students to
act reflectively requires the focus in a one-semester clinic on all four
of his organizing themes - lawyering as a social activity; problem solving in uncertain situations; lawyer's role as intermediary; and the importance of context - as well as conventional lawyering skills.
Obviously, expert representation of a client requires the use of reflection and use of all of these skills, but given what Aaronson himself
acknowledges as the "rudimentary nature" of students' knowledge, his
course description raises serious questions whether the cognitive demands of the vast nature of the material covered might actually impede the learning of reflective practice. 278 Aaronson, like many
Id. at 311.
Id. at 311-12.
Id. at 310.
Id. at 312.
Id. at 310.
Id. at 319 (emphasis added).
Id.
278 While at first glance, Aaronson's observation that the "organizing themes provide a
framework for discussing issues, such as empathy and detachment, while at the same time
focusing on the development of conventional lawyering skills" sounds commendable, further examination raises significant questions about the soundness of such an approach. If
considered seriously, each of those issues - empathy, detachment, conventional skills pose complex questions which require some doctrinal knowledge base (both in law and
271
272
273
274
275
276
277

CLINICAL LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 11:149

clinicians, seems to ignore the fact that a student's learning of legal
practice does not end at the completion of the course.
Most importantly, Aaronson fails to take into account adequately
the role played by domain knowledge in learning "practical judgment"
or reflective practice. The psychological studies described in this article clearly indicate that a knowledge base in the relevant legal doc-

trine is a prerequisite for the exercise of all four of Aaronson's
attributes of practical judgment. Problem-solving in uncertain situations, for example, requires the ability to access a doctrinal base as a

springboard for alternative solutions. 279 To understand context fully,
a lawyer needs to know what relevant contextual information to investigate. 280 And even the interpersonal relationships of lawyering - lawyering as a social activity and lawyer as intermediary - is grounded in

the law of professional responsibility. 281 Aaronson, however, barely
touches on this issue. If, as Aaronson acknowledges, students' pro-

gress in the clinic depends in large part on their ability to recall and
apply relevant knowledge, serious consideration must be given to
their grasp of relevant legal doctrine before they plunge into extensive

experiences with problem solving, analysis of context, or interpersonal
relationships. As the Patel studies in medical education suggest, with-

out assuring this knowledge base, a "practical judgment" course possibly could have the same pitfalls as the medical school PBL
curriculum. 282 Although complete mastery of the knowledge base is
obviously not required to learn practical judgment, sufficient command of relevant legal doctrine is essential.
C. Some Preliminary Thoughts on Taking Domain Knowledge Into
Account in Skills Training
The goals of all the skills teaching approaches that I have critihuman psychology) for answers.
279 See supra notes 110-12 and accompanying text.
280 See supra notes 99-105 and accompanying text.
281 In an article urging "ecological learning" in clinical programs, Brook Baker urges coparticipation of students and supervisors in handling cases:
[S]tudents learn best, in fact inevitably, through coordinated social action, through
coordinated social action, through participation in the world of practice ... [A] principal goal of legal education should be to intensify and enrich the quality of participation. As such, learning is more a process of successful enculturation to
coordinated forms of behavior than it is of knowledge acquisition.
Baker, supra note 1, at 24-25. Cognitive psychology studies fail to support this bald assertion. Indeed, one of Baker's own authorities for this proposition recognizes that expertise
requires both a doctrinal knowledge base and social experience. See id. at 25 n.91, quoting
Joseph M. Williams, On the Meaning of Legal Writer: Two Models of Growth and Development, 1 J. LEGAL WRITING INST. 1, 13 (1991) ("The process of becoming an expert is at

least as much a social process as an exercise of individual effort and intellect.").
282 See supra notes 165-68 and accompanying text.
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qued are very admirable, and students most certainly receive some
benefits from their exposure to explicit problem-solving methods, introductions in their first year to lawyering issues, and clinical courses
that seek to combine conventional skills and practical judgment training. All of these approaches are well thought out and cannot be dismissed lightly. Moreover, the findings of cognitive psychology
research are not so conclusive that a definitive assessment of the effectiveness of any particular course or approach can be made at this time.
But those findings do raise some important issues about the relationship between domain and tacit knowledge in the law that hopefully
can be probed seriously with future empirical research and curricular
experiments. In the meantime, however, that research suggests some
tentative approaches for taking domain knowledge into account more
effectively in law school skills curricula.
1.

Development of Effective Problem-Solving Schemas

The cognition studies described in Part II of this article demonstrate not only that domain knowledge and clinical knowledge are two
distinct modes of reasoning, but that a firm knowledge in basic doctrine is essential to organizing the knowledge acquired through practical experience. 283 As Patel and her associates put it, "Domain
knowledge informs practice, and practice, in turn, shapes knowledge. ' 284 Over time, the explicit "textbook" knowledge becomes tacit
knowledge as the practitioner develops scripts for handling different
kinds of problems. 28 5 The development of a professional from a novice to an expert requires the development of these schemas.
In the medical education context, Patel and her colleagues assert
that an effective teacher of this script-making process "needs to be
able to articulate knowledge [to medical trainees] that would normally
be tacit for a practitioner not engaged in instruction. ' 286 In other
words, in a specific clinical situation, the instructor should try to help
students apply their concepts of basic science to the problems raised
287
by the particular patient by making their reasoning process explicit.
For example, Patel and her associates
observed that a resident made a correct decision not to treat a pneumonia condition because he believed that it was caused by a medication that the patient had received (chemical pneumonitis).
However, when questioned about how one discriminates between a
283 See supra notes 78-87 and accompanying text.

284 Patel et al., supra note 4, at 76.
285 Id. at 88; Patel & Kaufman, supra note 10, at 121.
286 Patel et al., supra note 4, at 89.
287 Id.
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chemical pneumonitis and systematic pneumonia, he had difficulty
articulating reasons. Through a series of questions, the expert physician was able to elicit from the resident the tacit underlying assumptions underlying his decision. The expert challenged his
responses until he was able to construct a pattern of findings for
discriminating between these two conditions. The team could then
evaluate the decision and determine whether
the patient's condition
2 88
was consistent with chemical pneumonitis.
Through the instructor's questioning, the resident was able to apply
his domain textbook knowledge to the conditions of the patient and
also start to develop a script for handling the problem of chemical
pneumonitis. This process required both the resident's ability to access his biomedical knowledge and the instructor's capacity to train
the resident how to use this knowledge to structure problem-solving
scripts. 289 The goal of this method is to instruct students on the use of
290
this method when confronting any new problem.
These studies suggest that teaching effective problem solving in
the law school setting requires a recognition of the crucial role played
by legal doctrine in organizing practical experience. 29 1 Legal rules
and doctrine are not just a "tool" in the lawyer's toolbox; 292 they provide the overall framework for the compartments in the box. Like
their medical school counterparts, law students in clinical and other
skills courses need a foundation in the domain knowledge relevant to
problems that they are asked to solve. And like their medical school
counterparts, clinical law teachers need to be adept at raising appropriate doctrinal questions with students about their cases so that they
can begin to relate their client's problems to underlying doctrinal issues and start forming effective problem-solving scripts.
This research also has significant implications for developing ef288

Id.

Id. (observing, "Experienced physicians have evolved specific heuristics that can be
conveyed to medical trainess through effective clinical teaching.").
290 As discussed previously, experts explicitly access their domain knowledge base when
they face difficult problems. See supra notes 110-12 and accompanying text. For the novice or subexpert, any new problems is a difficult one and requires the use of this process.
291 See also Weinstein, supra note 15, at 51 (observing that legal education "cannot
teach skills without substance, nor usually teach that much doctrine without having students use it so they can structure it themselves").
292 Kerper, supra note 3, at 355. In a recent article providing a good review of some of
the literature on the differences in problem-solving methods for novices and experts, the
authors recognize that law students in skills classes need to develop schemas for handling
legal problems and identify inadequate knowledge base as one of the problems students
face in acquiring these schemas. Morin & Howells, supra note 42, at 672, 674-75. Like
other commentators, however, they minimizes the importance of a strong domain knowledge base in the development of such schemas. They suggest that the problem of inadequate knowledge base can be remedied merely by the distribution to students of readings
relevant to the legal context. Id. at 674.
289
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fective law school skills training courses either in live client clinics or
simulated lawyering programs. Instead of concentrating on teaching
specific problem-solving methods, such as brainstorming and hypotheses generation, 293 these courses should perhaps focus students on solving problems in which they have a substantial knowledge base both in
regard to the substantive and procedural legal rules. Since under the
present conventional law school curriculum, the first-year foundation
courses concentrate on common law doctrine and reasoning - in contracts, torts, property, and criminal law - appropriate subject matter
for student cases/problems should relate to those areas rather than
more complex statutory or administrative systems.2 94 Most students,
for example, should have a better knowledge base for developing
scripts about simple landlord/tenant, consumer, contract disputes,
negligence, or criminal cases than complex environmental, family law,
administrative law, or employment discrimination cases. Students
also should have a better ability to understand the procedural issues in
the context of a relatively straight-forward case in a single forum than
one involving multiple agency/court or state/federal fora. Moreover,
the repetitive nature of some of the issues in those common law cases
should give students the opportunity to apply the schemas they have
started to develop in one case to their next cases.
The findings of these studies do not rule out the use of more complex cases as subject matters for skills training. They do, however,
suggest the need for careful structuring of such courses. For students
to develop problem-solving schemas and more expert-like reasoning
skills, they first need a foundation in the doctrine underlying their
cases. Because of cognitive limitations, they should not be learning
this knowledge base at the same time they are learning to apply it.295
Accordingly, students should not be expected in a single-semester
course to acquire basic knowledge of the substance and procedure of a
complex legal area concurrently with their handling of cases in that
area. At the very least, such courses should have rigorous prerequisites in the relevant doctrine and procedural law. Ideally, they should
be capstones to other doctrinal courses in the area all organized with
293 See supra notes 230-33 and accompanying text.
294 For a general discussion of the importance of the basic first-year doctrinal curriculum
to the training of practitioners, see generally Harry T. Edwards, The Growing Disjunction
Between Legal Education & The Legal Profession, 91 MICH. L. REV. 2191, 2194 (1993).

295 See supra notes 234-37 and accompanying text. Indeed, in my own experience, I
have found that without an adequate knowledge base, students merely parrot methods I
have taught them in a previous case rather than learn the process for developing their own
problem-solving scripts. Cf. Weinstein, supra note 15, at 50 (noting that law students learn
less from hearing how an experienced lawyer handles a particular problem than learning
how to do the hard work themselves).
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the intent of training students to apply their knowledge in practice. 296
The cognition research also indicates that the need for a knowl-

edge base may not be alleviated by simply "giving the students the
applicable law." Some simulated courses provide students with sections of applicable law before they handle a problem in a particular
area, 297 and some clinical teachers attempt to address students' inadequacy in domain knowledge with intensive orientation classes before
the beginning of the semester. 2 98 Such an approach probably can pro-

vide students with an adequate foundation for the performance of
particular skills (for example, witness examination in a trial advocacy
course) or for routine case tasks (for example, filing papers). But it is
unlikely that this approach can effectively teach legal problem-solving

skills. The development of problem-solving schemata requires a more
extensive knowledge base than that provided by a few pages of relevant statutory or case materials or a mini-course front loaded at the

beginning of a clinical course. Most actual client problems do not fit
neatly into a package of materials, and only adequate knowledge of
domain principles is going to assist a practitioner in developing prob29 9
lem-solving abilities.
Finally, these studies may have important implications for those

instructors who want to teach their students to understand the political, economic, sociological, or psychological context of their client's
296 For an example of such a course, see UCLA School of Law, Course Description:Law
444: Clinical: Mergers and Acquisition Transaction, at http://www.law.ucla.edu/students/
academicinfo/coursedescriptions/clinicalmergersandacquisitionspower.html
(describing
simulation course in which students represent parties in a mergers and acquisition transaction after taking courses in Business Associations and preferably Securities Regulation and
Mergers and Acquisitions).
In a recent article discussing the advantages and disadvantages of students handling
big cases in clinics, the author acknowledges that "[situdents who are not able to quickly
master the file, absorb the case history, understand the client and grasp the necessary law
and procedure, are too easily relegated to observer status." Nancy M. Maurer, Handling
Big Cases in Law School Clinics, or Lessons from My Clinic Sabbatical, 9 CLIN. L. REV.
879, 892 (2003). She fails to recognize, however, that most students fall into this category.
Even in a two-semester clinical program, most students may face significant cognitive
problems not only mastering the file and case history, but acquiring a sufficient knowledge
base of the underlying doctrinal law and procedure to apply it in practice.
297 Kenneth S. Broun, Case File: Green v. Hall & Rose, in PROBLEMS & CASES IN TRIAL

ADVOCACY (Kenneth S. Broun & James H. Seckinger, eds. 4th ed. 1993) (National Institute of Trial Advocacy Fair Housing Act problem providing students with applicable statutes and memorandum of law).
298 See, e.g., Jacqueline St. Joan, Building Bridges, Building Walls: Collaboration Between Lawyers and Social Workers in a Domestic Violence Clinic and Issues of Client Confidentiality, 7 CLIN. L. REV. 403, 412 (2001) (intensive five-day orientation for a domestic
violence clinic).
299 See Patel & Kaufman, supra note 10, at 121. Even a routine eviction case, for example, may raise issues of lease construction, implied warranties, predicate notices, and propriety of service.
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cases. 300 Obviously, these issues are important and are relevant to the
overall problem-solving process. But that does not mean that all
clinical courses can address them. The research on cognitive load
demonstrates the limits on the amount that a student can learn at any
given time. Given the cognitive demands of learning how to structure
practical experience with domain knowledge, 30 1 it is questionable
whether students handling a particular client's case have the ability at least initially - to engage in problem solving the legal issues and, at
the same time, reflect extensively on the nonlegal context of the case.
In designing a course that raises these contextual issues, an instructor
should consider ways of addressing this problem, such as selecting
cases in a fairly simple subject matter area; concentrating on a very
limited, repetitive type of case within that area; focusing on only one
or two specific aspects of the cases; scheduling the course over a period of more than one semester to provide students with the space to
consider these issues; or introducing the contextual issues only after
students have begun to their develop problem-solving schemas.
2.

Creating the Environment for Creative Problem Solving

The studies on creativity described in Part II also suggest that
domain knowledge may be more essential to creative problem solving
than exhortations to be reflective or techniques to promote "thinking
outside the box." These studies demonstrate that creative products
are usually the outgrowth of the creator's knowledge in the domain,
not some revelation from heaven. 302 Additionally, they show that inadequate domain knowledge can actually have a negative effect on
the creative process. 30 3 Faced with a problem to be solved and an
insufficient knowledge base, the practitioner can become quite anxious and paralyzed, and this stress will most likely undermine creative
3°4
performance.
These findings have several important implications for teaching
creative problem-solving in law school skills courses. First, they suggest that the actual cases or simulated problems used as course material must take into account the level of the students' domain
knowledge. A number of creativity studies have shown that the "flow
experience" that results in creative productivity occurs when individuals feel they actually have a chance of completing the task at hand. 30 5
300 See supra notes 33-34.

301 See supra notes 65-66 and accompanying text.
302 See supra notes 70-71 and accompanying text.
303 See Chapman, supra note 55, at 35.
304 See AMABILE, supra note 50, at 254.
305 CSIKSZENTMIHALYI, FLOW, supra note 50, at 49, 97.

CLINICAL LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 11:149

If students feel overwhelmed by learning the basic legal doctrine relevant to the client's problem at the same time they are asked to develop fresh new insights and solutions to that problem, they are likely
to become frustrated with the process and unable to experience flow.
Put simply, the goals set for students in skills courses must be realistic
in terms of the students' knowledge of legal doctrine and experience
30 6
in the area.
Second, creativity studies indicate that students must be given adequate time to accomplish their tasks, given their limited knowledge
base. These studies demonstrate that creative products, even for experts in a field, often result only after a period of incubation, not as a
bolt of lightning from the sky. 30 7 For subexperts, with limited access
to domain knowledge and experience with cases, this incubation process may take much longer. Accordingly, the role of the skills teacher
should be to assist students in identifying the legal doctrine applicable
to a client's problem and to provide them sufficient time to develop
alternative solutions. 30 8 Obviously, in live client clinics case deadlines
often impede such a process, but the clinical instructor's selection of
subject matter and case selection criteria should take into account
these time requirements.
Finally, this research suggests that skills courses need to provide
students with the proper environment to encourage creative problemsolving. The Csikszentmihalyi studies show that certain surroundings
foster the creative process: those that provide easy access to the particular domain, stimulation of colleagues in neighboring offices, and
supportive environment. 30 9 These findings demonstrate that instructors of skills courses who want to encourage creative thinking by their
students not only need to take into account the level of domain
knowledge students bring into the course but devise methods for
nourishing that knowledge within the course. They should consider
ways of providing easy access to information - both legal and factual relevant to the cases or problems; methods for encouraging collegial
interchange on problems; and supportive supervisory relationships. In
306 See id. at 97. See generally Phyllis Meltzer & Harold Feder, Go With the Flow, 22 L.
PRAC. MGMT. 50, 54 (1996) (suggesting that "[1]egal jobs may need to be configured in such
a way as to be not too easy and too impossible, so that a subordinate, seeing the assignment, can recognize the challenge of the task and not be bored by the undertaking").
307 See CSIKSZENTMIHALYI, CREATIVITY supra note 50, at 98.
308 In my own experience as a clinical teacher, I have often become frustrated when a
student does not immediately see what I consider to be the "obvious" solution to a client's
problem. My frustration causes more anxiety in the student, and any possibility of creativity is destroyed. Lately, I have found that it is often more helpful and actually more efficient to guide students through the doctrine and then give them time on their own to
devise possible solutions.
309 CSIKSZENTMIHALYI, CREATIVITY,

supra note 50, at 127-45.
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a live-client clinical course, for instance, instructors should consider
the benefits of limiting the subject matter of cases to a single subject
matter area or type of case so that all the students become steeped in
the relevant domain knowledge and can work together with their colleagues and supervisors to develop innovative scripts for handling
their clients' problems.
3.

Overcoming the Inflexibility of Scripted Practice

As described previously, while an expert's domain knowledge is
essential in developing problem-solving skills, it can also hinder effective problem solving. 310 The scripts used by experts can lead to inflexibility in approaching problems. And forward reasoning, by rejecting
information considered irrelevant, can ignore creative solutions that
might result from the less efficient process of backward reasoning. 311
Although providing no definitive answers to this problem, the
psychological studies suggest that the expert scripting and flexibility
are not necessarily incompatible. 312 Both are necessary for effective
problem solving. Without the proceduralization of scripts, a practitioner lacks a strategy for solution and has a difficult time beginning
the problem-solving process. Without flexibility, she lacks the capacity to consider alternative solutions to difficult problems. 313 The practitioner who is over-scripted risks the danger of overlooking a more
effective solution to the problem; the practitioner who is underscripted but flexible may not even be able to identify the basic contours of the problem. To combine the benefits of both scripting and
flexibility, the literature suggests, practitioners need to learn how to
"proceduralize flexibility. '314 Effective problem solvers need to learn
how to distinguish between those situations in which their schemas
should be used and those in which routine procedures should be modified to adapt to difficult or unusual problems. Moreover, skills instructors should teach their students strategies to exploit the
knowledge they have learned in more effective ways, for instance,
methods for explicitly generating sets of related legal or factual
theories.
In regard to skills training in the law school setting, this research
indicates that instructors need to encourage a balance between entirely scripted and completely open-ended lawyering. If, on the one
hand, students are taught that every case should be approached as a
310 See supra note 308 and accompanying text.
311 See supra notes 309 and accompanying text.
312 Frensch & Sternberg, supra note 57, at 180-82.
313 See id. at 181.
314 Id. at 182.
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totally unique problem, they will not develop the skills to form efficient problem-solving schemas and to engage in forward reasoning.
If, on the other hand, students are taught (as they often are in practice) that every case can be approached according to a routine script,
they will not learn the skills to solve difficult and ill-structured
problems. The real value of skills training in law schools, then, may
not be so much to train students in special problem-solving techniques
as to assist them in learning how to determine when to use schemas in
problem-solving and when to adapt or modify them. As students organize their schemas by experiencing the representation of a client in
a simulated or actual case, the instructor can guide them through the
process of identifying both the common aspects of this particular type
of legal problem and those circumstances that deviate from the
routine.
The foundation for this kind of instruction is an adequate knowledge base by the students. A solid understanding of the legal rules
applicable to the case assists students in not only organizing their
schemas, but recognizing deviations from the doctrine. Certainly this
kind of teaching can and should take into account emotional, economic, and political factors in the client's situation. But, as the studies
discussed in this article suggest, effective problem solving in practice
does not begin with a consideration of those factors. Rather, it starts
only after a firm understanding of domain knowledge.
CONCLUSION

This article has reviewed some of the recent studies in cognitive
psychology on the problem-solving and creative processes in an attempt to develop some tentative thoughts on effective methods for
teaching problem-solving in law school skills courses. As is apparent
from the description of these studies, their findings are not entirely
definitive and at times are even contradictory. Moreover, a serious
question can be raised whether this research, especially the studies on
medical education and practice, is even relevant to legal problem solving and the instruction of law students. Indeed, this article has
demonstrated the need for more extensive empirical studies into the
reasoning process of lawyers and the relation of doctrinal and skills
training in law schools.
One conclusion of the psychological research, however, seems
fairly clear: the nervous system has definite limits on the amount of
information it can process at any given time. For that reason, psychologists hypothesize that experts develop schemas to solve problems
and disregard information they consider irrelevant. And because of
cognitive load theory, other psychologists suggest that complex prob-
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lem-solving heuristics actually can hinder effective problem solving.
Finally, relying in part on this theory, Patel and her associates hypothesize that medical students trained in curricula combining the instruction of domain and clinical knowledge are less effective diagnosticians
than those trained in conventional curricula in which students first obtain training in the biomedical sciences and then engage in clinical
practice.
Even with all the limitations of the psychological research and the
problems with applying this research to the legal setting, cognitive
load theory has important implications for skills training in law
schools. Put simply, significant limitations exist on the amount of information that can be processed by a student in learning legal problem
solving in a skills course.
Skills teachers need to be honest with
themselves and understand that in a one or two semester course educational goals must be pared back and that all aspects of the problemsolving process cannot be addressed at the same time. 315
This article has argued that an essential aspect of this process is
an adequate level of knowledge of the applicable legal doctrine.
Before a novice lawyer can embark on solving any legal problem, she
has to have a knowledge base to organize her experience, to communicate her ideas to others, to rely on for handling difficult situations,
and to develop creative solutions. Although no one would dispute the
value of teaching students to consider psychological, political, and economic factors in this process, an inordinate amount of attention has
been paid to those issues in recent skills-training literature. Given the
crucial role played by domain knowledge in problem solving and the
limits of students' cognitive load, this article proposes that skills training curricula place a high priority on training students how to use their
doctrinal training to become effective and creative legal problemsolvers.

315

See Aaronson, supra note 3, at 286.

